Trump and the Billionaires

It was a pleasure to read Mel Bienenfeld’s Tempest article “What is Trumpism now?”. Unusually, in contrast to a left discourse that is normally so full of glib answers, he posed a series of questions. Behind all of them was the same simple concern—whether Trump is an authoritarian or a fascist, or whatever other label we want to give him, how do we understand this moment? In particular, how do we make sense of the reality that the United States is now led by a leader whose plans for a trade war with China, and beyond, are not the preferred option of the majority of the capitalist class?

Before addressing the queries raised by Bienenfeld, it’s worth setting out my broader position. In an essay on this site a year ago, I predicted that Trump would win the popular vote. I went on to argue that (with the exception of the events of January 6) Trump’s first term had not brought the United States closer to fascism. He had failed to make allies; he had shed advisers at an extraordinary rate; and on the indices of authoritarianism (including deportations, executions, the Mexico wall) Trump had done less to increase the repressive state than the Democrat presidents who had preceded and followed him. I did also say that Trump was likely to seek revenge on those people who had pursued him through the courts. But I predicted, if anything, that he would—like other recent far-right governments—fall short of the right-wing program of the 1930s.

In a second essay, published by Spectre this month, I reversed those assessments. I argued that as a result of Trump’s 2020-2021 turn toward social media, and courting of QAnon and the far-right grouplets, Trump had built up something that no one else in today’s global far right has: a militia. His second term, I argued, has so far been unlike his first. Since his inauguration, Trump has governed with a degree of authoritarianism that matches the classic Marxist descriptions of the interwar far right, that is, a mass movement that is counter-revolutionary in the extent to which it purges the democratic state. Trump has “so far” ruled like a fascist. Whether he will go further depends not just on him but on the extent of resistance.

The reason for my remaining caution before saying that Trump will continue as he has begun is that I have in mind the classical Marxist debate about Bonapartism, as well as the erroneous belief shared by the likes of August Thalheimer, Antonio Gramsci, and even Leon Trotsky that the interwar right had no real programme other than the stabilization of capitalism. That assessment was accurate in relation to most other counter-revolutionary regimes in Europe between 1918 and 1939 (including Hungary and Poland) and after the war (Spain, Portugal). But it was inaccurate in relation to Hitler and Mussolini, who radicalized in office—in part, because the first breakthrough government (Italy) was joined by another (Germany) and the two regimes then participated in mutual cooperation, rivalry, and conflict, radicalizing one another in a competition to go furthest, which culminated in territorial expansion and world war. Even if I am right that Trump’s United States is—thanks to his militia, and the ability to threaten violence—the closest counterpart anywhere to interwar reaction, then it is not necessarily the case that his government will continue to radicalize without another ally and competitor to push it forward.

The future facing the United States could easily be something more like Francoist Spain, which began with terrible acts of violence against Communists and Socialists before settling down after 1945 into something much more like a gerontocracy, or Greece during the 1967–73 dictatorship, a society in under which, though repressive and reactionary, no more than 10,000 to 15,000 political prisoners were ever placed in camps, horrible though the conditions inside them were. There are quite a lot of possibilities in which Trump holds to his current trajectory, but his endpoint falls short of 1930s’ style industrial genocide or a new world war.

I hope that lengthy statement of my position will enable me to address Bienenfeld’s questions more concisely. I paraphrase them as follows:

(1) How has Trump been so successful in capturing the Republican Party when the ambitions of the people around him are radically different from the politics that had dominated in that party during the preceding 40 years? One answer is that the radicalization of the right has not taken place just in the United States, but in country after country, even ones that have been democracies for decades. The French center right now votes without complaint for the RN a party founded in 1972 by a cell of unrepentant neo-Nazis (formerly Nouvelle Ordre) with a record of violent attacks on their left-wing enemies and on politicians. The Italian center right also votes without objections for a party that is the successor to and shares the same logo as the Italian Social Movement in the 1960s, a party that was the patron to countless terrorist cells.

The how of this process varies from country to country, but the overall pattern is the same. The United States is shaped by the rules operating at the state level, each of which requires that voters choose between one of just the two corporate parties. But those local dynamics are less important than global phenomena. In response to the 2008 economic crash, the Left was seen as the party of continuity, while the Right became the party of change. From that point onward, the center right opened itself to its more radical elements and was rewarded by electoral success. The Left globally, led by parties in the United States and Britain, chose to gatekeep and exclude its radicals, including Corbyn and Sanders. The result is a political struggle that pits authoritarians and aspiring dictators, on one side, against social neoliberals, on the other. In that unequal conflict, the neoliberals repeatedly lose.

(2) Why has the capitalist class abandoned mainstream conservatism? In part because mainstream conservatives have done worse at winning elections than radicals to their right. Another way to address the same question is to say that the capitalists had not abandoned old-style politics—or not prior to last November, which is why the Democrats’ fundraising far outstripped Trump’s in 2023. The crucial point appears to be that, under capitalism, a group of politicians intending to capture the state do not need the assent of all of the capitalist class, but only a part of it.

Trump has achieved hegemony through the support of some capitalist blocs that had long preferred oligarchy to democracy (the oil sector, to give one example), and through his recent adoption by the one fraction of the business elite that is most profitable and is best placed to lead capitalism as a whole (Big Tech). Those who have gone over to Trump’s side in recent weeks and months include capitalists whose future expansion depends on their capture of state subsidies, which Trump is offering at an unprecedented scale (Every cut associated with DOGE is a chance to relocate the same funds to Trump’s corporate allies).

(3) Why didn’t the capitalist class abandon the conservatives before? Because in a democratic system, there is a division of labor—the politicians, not business, have the initiative. Capital can veto a strategy to which enough capitalists object, but wealth does not instigate. Trump is the first person to show that such a victory might be sustained. And, of course, he is helped by the longer term processes I have already mentioned, including the slow working through the system of the logic of the 2008 clash and the success of far right parties in so many other countries. All of those needed to happen before he could win.

(4) Shouldn’t we see Trump as an opportunist? No. In common with other successful far right leaders, he does improvise in relation to events. But many parts of his program predate even 2016 (for example, his support for tariffs, which he has publicly backed since the 1980s). The important point is not to expect his rule to follow the pattern of his first administration. He has so many more allies this time, and they are better equipped. Notice how few resignations we have seen compared to eight years ago.

(5) Should we expect the capitalist class to break with Trump in relation to his promises to govern transactionally, especially overseas? For many Democrats, this is the part of his rule that is the most shocking. They can tolerate the ethnic cleansing of Gaza, the kidnapping of student protesters and their deportation, the extraordinary rendition of people legally in the US to foreign jails, but the idea of a 10 percent tariff on British goods is barbarism. Yet the pattern so far has been one in which elite critics have toned down their criticisms and made peace with Trump. Republican legislators have already been cowed into assent by threats from Trump’s supporters. The next group to face intimidation, and threats from Trump’s online and street followers  will be the judges. Given the fact of the Supreme Court majority, the lack of resistance from within Congress, and the significant success the regime has had in cowing law firms – we should not expect them  to hold out for long in their current stance of opposition.

The pattern of the 1930s was that many business leaders maintained their politics after Mussolini and Hitler’s seizure of power. The liberals and non-fascist conservatives were rich enough, and sometimes physically distant enough, to keep going with their old political hobbies, even when the parties they had previously supported had been banned. But their opposition was limited and muted. They took a lead from those politicians who told them it was better for the right to remain in power than for its opponents to risk the threat of civil war. When one side has a private army and the other does not, it is easy for liberal fears to sabotage resistance, even in those crises during which the aspiring dictator faces the open, undoubted, and active hostility of a majority of the people. If socialists cannot organize ourselves while the legal opportunities to do so remain in place, we will lose. We may not have much time.

(6) Many conservatives remain committed to the separation of powers. Won’t they resist Trump? They didn’t stop him winning the Republican nomination even after January 6. Trump’s own government is staffed by vast numbers of people who previously denounced him. Unless and until anti-Trump opposition becomes so visible that the likes of Marco Rubio can see no way of saving their careers except by changing sides and denouncing Trump, any conservative opposition to authoritarianism will have little consequence.

(7) Will anti-statist Republicans revolt against Trump’s statism? No, because their libertarianism was always cynical. They share with the new regime a belief in the massive expansion of the powers of the executive, combined with laws intended to deliver greater private wealth to the rich.

I am not suggesting that the regime is bereft of conflict. Over the last few weeks, we have seen a sharp internal struggle over tariffs, although it would be wrong to see the faultline as being essentially statists versus libertarians. The conflict produced two camps: on the one side, that large part of Trump’s base which believes that through tariffs he could rebuild the well-aid industrial jobs of the 1950s to fit with his dreams of the restored nuclear family (how could that possibly work, without strong unions led by the very leftists who Trump seeks to silence?) And, on the other side, that large part of US capital which employs people and fixed capital overseas –  businesses like Nike which employs, directly and indirectly, 500,000 people in Vietnam alone. Trump’s cadre of Fox journalists celebrated the tariffs. Finance baulked at Trump’s sheer incompetence in taking on the whole world at once rather than focussing his energies on his intended antagonist, China. The libertarians in Trump’s camp sensed that he would back down in whole or in part, and increased the volume of their criticisms – late – from friendly encouragement to assertive lobbying.

This wasn’t a sign that the libertarians were likely to quit Trump any time soon. They will complain about policies from inside his camp, but they will not cease to see Trump as their great opportunity and the anti-Trump social forces as their main antagonist.

What we need, as David Whitehouse has argued on this site, is a new form of left cooperation. Between the disastrous “united front from below” of the early 1930s (in which leftists would demand of potential allies that they join left campaigns and work under Communist control) to the unprincipled Popular Fronts of the mid-decades (in which radicals would swallow their criticisms, and swarm behind liberal election campaigns) history affords many negative models of how to get this wrong – as well as a principled point, in between those two extremes. The United Fronts of the near future will bring together the people whose demands (in campaigns against extraordinary rendition, in labour struggles, in the movement against Musk) break with the many remaining areas of agreement between the two main parties. It will require people crossing old lines of hostility – Communists working with left Democrats – and the emergence of new people who incarnate that alliance.

Splits in the regime, if they happen, will fortify these alliances. But all parts of the Trump coalition are our enemy – we shouldn’t wait for them.

If you were to sum up my argument, I believe Bienenfeld is wrong to worry about Trump ushering in a violent future and paving the way for a more committed ideologue after 2029. The counter-revolution does not belong to the future. Nor indeed does that profound change that is needed for movements to emerge which might topple Trump. If there is not sufficient resistance to Trump now, with meaningful numbers behind it, others yet to join the struggle will have to fight in our place, and they will be in a far weaker position than us. Under any kind of dictatorship, conservative and liberal criticisms weaken over time, the police and immigration officials become stronger, and judges become less willing to dissent. Hard as things seem now, it may be years before the activists of the future enjoy a chance even as limited as the one we face now.