What is Trumpism now? 

Author’s Note: This article was drafted several weeks ago. Events since then, occurring at a breathtakingly rapid pace, have revealed further aspects of Trump’s regime and the response to it. Those events – including of course the crackdown on dissent regarding Palestine in particular, blatant violations of civil liberties, attacks on universities, etc. – would of course have been included in the article. They may prove to clarify how we should think about Trumpism and our response to it.

In the first sentence of his article “Trump Seizes Power in D.C.,” reprinted in Tempest, Ashley Smith characterizes Donald Trump’s current project as “an authoritarian nationalist transformation of U.S. society and its state.” This description, and the ensuing article elaborating it, is the most accurate summary of “Trumpism” and its likely evolution that I’ve seen in a socialist publication. Marxists need to understand this major turn in the direction of the world’s leading state, and Smith’s article—along with the analysis of the Trump coalition he made before the inauguration—represents, hopefully, the beginning of a much-needed conversation that can help us to understand ongoing developments and their potential trajectories.

“Authoritarian nationalism” is certainly a much better way to understand current dynamics than “fascism”, though we should not ignore important commonalities with fascism. These include an appeal to aggrieved sectors of the population; promises to return to an imagined glorious past; centering extreme nationalism, as defined in terms of specific mythic characteristics; dependence on a powerful leader; vilifying “elites” who have illegitimately gained control of the centers of power; scapegoating and “othering” certain groups, both inside and outside the nation; a supposed need to redeem the nation from a victimization by those and other groups; inculcating a climate of fear among those likely to object; and the creation (so far just potentially!) of a paramilitary street-fighting force.

But the fact that much of the left accepts a full “fascist” characterization, with little reflection about what distinguishes current events from classical fascism, prevents us from thinking clearly and strategically about what’s going on. If there is to be, at some time in the near future, a broad network of organizations with sufficient social weight to do more than minimize the worst instances of brutality—if we are to build the “infrastructure of dissent” that we need—this network will need to develop a clear, common strategic vision that will sustain it through Trump’s four years and well beyond.

I don’t want to imply, though, that a more complete analysis is necessary before those suffering under Trump’s attacks can begin to develop an effective resistance. I’m certainly in agreement with Smith’s article on this score, and with Tempest’s January 17 editorial about the immediate need to develop broad-based, non-sectarian resistance, independent of the Democratic Party and staff-directed organizations. Indeed, the process of building this resistance can itself help to create both the organizational and analytical basis for a future, more strategic, orientation.

What I want to discuss here are the many puzzling aspects of Trumpism—let’s call it that—which make it difficult to understand, at least for me. Unlike many articles whose titles include a question, this one won’t attempt to provide an answer. Rather, I hope that it will evoke possible answers from others who may be better informed or possess deeper historical understanding.

The puzzle of Trumpism begins with why it has succeeded so utterly in becoming dominant on the conservative end of U.S. politics. It has often been said that Trump’s election is a symptom of economic and social crisis, and in several senses this is clearly true. Masses of middle- and working-class people have been suffering, not just due to recent consumer price hikes, or even the slump that began in the Great Recession, but during the entire neoliberal period from the mid-1970s on. Mainstream politics, as practiced by both capitalist parties, no longer appeals to many sectors of the population, and the utter failure of the Democrats even to understand the life experience of those sectors (to say nothing of that party’s orientation to professional classes) credibly explains the appeal of a supposedly powerful “outsider” who promises to hold nothing back in cleaning things up.

But the welfare of lower strata of the U.S. population is certainly not what motivated the authors of Project 2025 to call for dismantling the “administrative state.” Neither were the continuing sluggish growth of GDP and productivity. From the standpoint of the capitalist class, there was no compelling reason to abandon mainstream conservatism, risk defying legal constraints, pardon armed rioters, gut the Justice Department and the FBI, etc.

Certainly the promise to massively deregulate the economy—of course, accompanied by further corporate tax breaks—was attractive to capital, but significant aspects of such a program would have been attractive at any time, say during the second Bush presidency. There was nothing analogous to the threat of a powerful and potentially revolutionary workers’ movement in the 1920’s and 1930’s, (making fascism useful, even necessary, to capitalists) or even the 1960’s successes of labor and social movements in the U.S., which inhibited capitalists’ ability to restore profitability during the serious economic crisis in the mid-1970’s (leading to the neoliberal rollbacks of those successes).

It is possible, I think, to view the adoption of a deeply deregulatory program as simply a case of opportunism: people will vote for Trump out of despair and admiration for his showmanship and posturing, and Trump in power will offer further show for the masses (including all-too-real attacks on supposed enemies) and a deregulatory heaven for capitalists.

But if the shrinking of the state, and even Project 2025’s promise to “restore the family to the center of American life,” were attractive to conservative capitalists and Republican-oriented thinkers, other aspects of Trump’s program have shocked and worried them. Perhaps the most serious of these is the administration’s moves to end the 80-year role of the U.S. military in promoting and maintaining global (capitalist) security, replacing the Pax Americana with a transactional projection of power in the individual interest of the U.S. (Europeans were shocked to observe in Munich just how much the U.S. is moving in this direction, and their fears were even further confirmed with the humiliation of Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office. But even before Trump was re-elected General Mark Milley’s remark that Trump is “fascist to the core” likely had more to do with the candidate’s military intentions than his stated preference for generals “like Hitler had”)

The nominations of Hegseth, Gabbard and Patel sent a clear message of intent that a complete overhaul of security policy would be in the works. The fact that all three had no demonstrated competence in running agencies like those they are now in charge of (and in the case of the last two at least, demonstrated views suspect among traditional conservatives) did not prevent them from being confirmed by politicians fearing the end of their careers (via being “primaried”). However, traditional Republicans not holding office have expressed deep concern behind the scenes.

Trumpist economic policy raises similar questions. The focus on punitive tariffs and “deals” with immediate payoffs risks loss of U.S. influence among low- and middle-income nations and abandoning the field to China. Tariffs in effect with the E.U., Canada and Mexico have provoked responses from these erstwhile allies, and trade wars may well escalate, slowing economic growth and pushing consumer prices up further. (When the 25% tariffs were first announced, the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board announced the “Dumbest Trade War in History”).

Many aspects of Trump’s idiosyncratic, self-interested, and often reckless behavior can be cited as not in the interest of capital. But one that merits particular attention—and may in fact involve, in part, some serious planning—is the willingness to break Constitutional law, or at least seriously challenge it. The initial, and still primary, example of this is the withholding of Congressionally directed funding streams. Another is the mass firings of Federal employees protected by Civil Service or other rules.

Commentators have pointed out that whatever portions of these actions survive after legal challenges have run their course will represent a successful increase of executive power at the expense of the legislature. Pushing this boundary is clearly part of Trump’s agenda. It is hard to imagine, though, that the surface unanimity observed among Congressional Republicans is characteristic of conservative thinkers and capitalists generally on the issue of the separation of powers. If Trump should refuse a clear court order, provoking a “Constitutional crisis,” the shakeup to the stability and legitimacy of the U.S. state will not be welcomed among elites of any political stripe.

Additional questions are raised by other aspects of Trump’s moves. The “sledgehammer” approach to spending and staffing cuts has resulted in many unintended consequences. The administration had to rescind some of the initial cuts when leaders of institutions such as hospitals and universities complained that they would not be able to function. Elon Musk’s clumsy moves in the same direction within government agencies have begun to provoke pushback not just from the top but, perhaps more significantly, from workers and their allies. Musk himself is not accustomed to being concerned with any damage he creates, but the fallout will certainly be felt politically.

This clumsiness and apparent lack of planning may or may not portend the ultimate failure of Trumpism. A lot will depend on how strong, visible, and coherent the resistance is. Will there be a permanent expansion of the power of the US executive branch? Will a movement for an extreme libertarian anti-statism, promoted by Silicon Valley tech titans and upheld, ironically, by a hypertrophy of the police and military aspects of the state, continue? Will it succeed? After Trump himself is gone, will his presidency have enabled J.D. Vance and others to develop the strength of an actual ideologically fascist movement—more farsighted and less self-interested than Trumpism itself—ready to face a growing movement of workers and the oppressed? Should we view Trumpism as an interim development in a period fraught with dangerous possibility? If so, what follows could be much better, or a lot worse.

Featured Image Credit:Painting by Hekka Halonen modified by Tempest.

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