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Imperial poison in Russian politics

Reaction, cynicism, and division three years after the invasion of Ukraine


As we approach the three year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oleg Shein, a Russian historian, and a former MP in the Russian State Duma, assesses the impact on Russian politics both now and for its future. 

I came to left-wing political life in 1989. It was a time of deep crisis in the Soviet Union and the beginning of a painful process of neoliberal reform. There were no members of the Communist Party in my family, but my family held socialist views, and I started reading Marxist literature early. I saw that after a short period of democracy, after the fall of the Soviet Union, a dictatorship would be established in our country. There is no democracy when property is concentrated in the hands of oligarchs.

I organized meetings against neoliberal reforms. I also organized strikes in factories and helped bring legal actions in defense of social and democratic rights. In 1994 my fellow-countrymen supported me for the first time in the elections to the regional legislature. In 1999, I was elected  to the State Duma, and I worked as a member of parliament for 30 years. Of course, we had problems with electoral fraud, but a wide network of grassroots movements of trade-unionists, housing activists, animal rights activists, and others allowed us to successfully resist these obstacles.

It’s important to note that I have been based in the city and region of Astrakhan, a multinational southern region on the Caspian Sea. One third of our one million inhabitants are Muslims. Astrakhan is an old trading city with a tradition of dialogue between people of different ethnicities and religions. My experience of representing the people of Astrakhan, and being an activist in the region, has been important to my own political development and outlook.

But many things changed in 2022. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the Putin government overwhelmingly relied upon military conscripts and recruits, including Astrakhan. Over four thousand men from my region were sent to fight in Ukraine. As of today, more than six hundred have been killed. This imperialist invasion changed the politics of Russia and Astrakhan too. How do we explain what happened to Russian society, and what should we expect next?

The anti-war party

As a general matter, Russian polls should be treated with skepticism. Public opinion polls are conducted in conditions in which open anti-war positions carry the risk of serious fines and even criminal prosecution. Over twenty thousand Russians have been  detained or fined and hundreds have been sent to prison for years for their anti-war views. Those who are labelled “foreign agents,” like me, lose the opportunity to work, and their property may be confiscated by the state. Nonetheless, the results of national public polls on current opinions about the invasion and war can be very helpful in understanding political dynamics in Russia.

Before looking at the polls, it is also necessary to understand something about the different entities that conduct themOne example is Tzargrad, a holding company owned by an infamous far-right oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, which runs the Tsargrad TV channel. Malofeev is a right-wing Russian nationalist who works closely with the dictatorship and supports the building of prisons and the execution of dissidents. He has founded groups like the Russian Society of Philanthropists for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood and the Safe Internet League, a pro-censorship organization.

In April 2023, a little more than a year after the Russian invasion, the pro-regime, far-right Tzargrad, showed that only 37.6 percent of respondents “fully support” the invasion of Ukraine. “Partial support” was at 15.6 percent, putting total support at 50.3 percent. This was against a total of 35 percent opposed to the invasion and war (26.5 percent, wholly in opposition, and 9.1 percent conditionally opposed).

A third of respondents also supported the return of the captured territories to Ukraine and a reinstatement of the January 2022 borders. Considering that the Russian Criminal Code promises 4-year prison terms for damaging the “territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,” and with the state authorities calling for “the reunion of this land with the Motherland,” respondents’ anti-war answers were indeed brave acts.

Moreover, another 15-20 percent were in favor of returning the occupied lands to Ukraine if this idea was supported by the head of state. And not only Tsargrad shows such data. Levada Center is an NGO that conducts polling and research and has itself been declared a “foreign agent” by the Russian state. It estimates the level of anti-war sentiment to be as high as 34 percent. The state-owned VCIOM puts opposition to the war at about 20 percent. The net-channel Nezygar, at a time when it was closely tied to the Putin administration, noted in the autumn of 2023, that 41 percent of Russians, in retrospect, would not have pursued the so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine.

Having reviewed  the full scope of polling, I believe about 30 percent of the Russian population are against this war. It is not only liberals or the young but also people on the Left and of all different ages. While not a majority, this is significant opposition. Even in conditions in which they do not have the opportunity to speak openly about their position, this group has proven stable.

These estimates are confirmed by the recent presidential elections in the spring of 2024. My good friend, ex-MP Boris Nadejdin announced his intention to participate in this campaign and he put forward a ceasefire position. Before this he was not a well known politician. But after three weeks he was polling at ten percent support and growing. Of course, his candidacy was quickly declared illegitimate by the Central Election Commission, and he was removed from the ballot.

Military party

The other side of the coin to the 30 percent opposed to the war is the wide, sometimes proto-fascist, support for the invasion of Ukraine. In the early days of the invasion, I was shocked. All the country’s social networks (with the exception of Facebook which is more commonly used by oppositional forces and those critical of Putin’s regime) were filled with messages from thousands of citizens about the seizure of Ukraine, the usefulness of killing prisoners, and the correctness of destroying towns and villages. Some of my own friends discussed killing people in other countries as rational and encouraged this goal.

There was a tide of hatred towards the U.S., western governments, and the West generally. At least one hundred thousand Russians wrote comments under a Joe Biden social media post about U.S. support for Ukraine. These comments were a blend of threat and glee. It was not only a question of Ukraine. When the invasion began there was a common line of discussion that if only the conquest of Ukraine was successful, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and/or the Baltic states would be next in line. This was openly discussed on social media, evening TV-shows, the pages of major newspapers, and, moreover, in parliament. During one Duma committee meeting, one senator I know well opined that many small countries have no right to sovereignty.

Every evening, we could see television broadcasts  about nuclear strikes on Berlin, London, Paris, Baku, Warsaw, and, of course, on U.S.cities.

After three years of war, such sentiment has weakened, but, even though the invasion of Ukraine has proven to be long, unsuccessful and bloody, it has not disappeared. How had we arrived here? Why was such talk possible? What kind of people in Russia supported this and how many people were poisoned by such a cannibalistic ideology?

Let’s return to public opinion polls. Tzargrad estimated a firm support for the war at 37 percent. But in fact, it’s half as much.

Infamous far-right “philosopher,” Aleksandr Dugin, writes that only 20 percent of Russians dream of taking Kiev or all of Ukraine. The “foreign agent” Levada Center put this number at 20 to 25 percent. VCIOM, which again is close to power, has this number at only about 10 to 15 percent. Like the anti-war position,the rabid pro-imperialist position does not represent the majority of people, but they are not a marginal part of society. It’s quite a large group.

This is the party of war. We are predominantly but not exclusively talking about men of the oldest age groups. What motivates them? What are they missing? Why would they want to kill people in a neighboring country and, in other countries too?

We are approaching a very difficult issue. Scholars from Levada Center released a two-volume research study about the psychology of Russian society. They write about the challenges encountered by alienated individuals who are facing a powerful state that can destroy individual lives very easily. They analyze the systematic suppression of any self-organization in Russia, including free trade-unions, environmental initiatives, movements of homeowners, and even grassroots actions in memory of the heroes of World War II.

In this world of ruined horizontal communications, individuals cannot be sure of their own future. This leads to both disorientation and disillusionment. But the state offers a simple answer: hate. Like a TV switch, the direction of hatred has been changing for decades: liberals, gays, Ukrainians, foreign workers, atheists, homeless dogs and their defenders, Azerbaijanis, again gays, again Ukrainians, again foreign workers, and always the West. Sometimes China. The enemy at the doorstep? Democracy?  In these conditions the country is turning into a besieged camp.  It’s a dangerous western influence meant for oafs. The forces of the state claim that there is not really democracy anywhere. They call it a venom, which poisons the brain.

What about the friendship between peoples? Such a notion is dismissed as an illusion, a mystification, a form of hypocrisy. They claim that Russians were killed by savages in Central Asia and South Caucasus. That it was 40 years ago does not matter, what’s the difference? Concerns about corruption? They acknowledge that the world is not perfect, and then claim that the struggle against corruption is only a specific tool in the struggle for power, concluding that all politicians are the same and it’s the same everywhere.

Therefore, they claim, there is no difference between countries and political systems. It is seen as extremely stupid to discuss the social experience of other societies. This is the logic: There are slaves like us living there. But at least our elite have a national culture (and the top sometimes give us some benefits, some funds), while foreigners want to seize our natural resources and convert us to homosexuality.

It seems like a caricature, but I’ve always met the same argument. This is a very simple and coherent system of views, however cynical and hateful. And this is the basis for supporting the war against the world.

Also, we must not forget about the money involved. If “a man is a wolf to a man” (as the old Russian proverb has it), and fighting against the enemy is a reason for pride, why not take the money and participate in a war? Wages in Russia are very low. In my town, $500 a month is considered a decent income. Many people live on only $300, and retirees typically receive only $200. But if someone signs a contract with the Defense Ministry, they will receive $2000 per month and from $10000 to $30000 as a first bonus (depending on the region from which they are recruited). Moreover, their relatives have $60,000 in case of death, and their children can go to university without fees and exams. Decent conditions!

Wagner, the famous private military company, has a cynical slogan: “nothing personal, we were paid”. Recently, they organized a “patriotic lesson” in one Russian school under this banner.

Conformists party

Of course, most people don’t want to invite any problem with the state, but they also don’t want to have anything to do with the war. They support a “special military operation,” but without a doubt they will support peace.

They are confident that they have no chance to influence the decision of the authorities, so they formally agree with any instructions from the top. Really, they want only peace of mind. This contradiction was clearly visible during the first wave of mobilization in the autumn of 2022. The state drafted 300,000 soldiers, but another 500,000 fled Russia. After this experience the Kremlin never resorted to such risky tools again. Sixty-two percent of respondents understood or even supported the deserters. It was a cold shower for the war party.

Now only 20 percent of Russians oppose peace with Ukraine. The conformist majority wants a normal life, without ceding “new regions” but also without new conquests. The head of the pro-government VCIOM says: “Most Russians don’t want to take Kiev. If they had their way, they would not have launched a military operation.” And further: “most delegate the task of formulating peace terms to the president: you decide for yourself what the conditions should be, tell us when it’s time to make peace. We will support you.”

The fees for military volunteers are constantly increasing, and this is a direct proof of the state’s problems with its military initiatives.

Deep split without deep crisis

Public opinion polls show that the ratio between the three above-described groups is very stable. It has not changed for three years. Why?

First, despite expectations, the standard of living remains stable. Some strata have lost their incomes— especially retirees, employees of public utilities, education and medicine—while others have benefited. The devaluation of the ruble and the fierce anti-immigrants politics have resulted in the number of foreign workers decreasing from 9 to 6.5 million people. In addition 1.5 million people are fighting at the front and about 0.8 million people left the country. At the same time, in 2024 alone at least $75 billion was poured into the military industrial complex. There is a shortage in the labor market and the wages of some parts of the working class are really growing. For example, Gazprom workers in my region now earn twice as much than before the war.The prices are rising, but the wages are rising faster. Not for everyone, but still.

Second, the struggle at the front is a matter for volunteers. Surely, we cannot forget about the 300.000 draftees, but 70 percent of the men who are currently in Ukraine have made a decision to enlist. That’s why their injury or death is not connected, in the minds of Russians, with their own fates or the fate of their relatives. It’s the choice of the front-line soldiers without risks for others.

Russians live (for now) a normal peaceful life. It’s very important to understand this. The choice between war and peace now is not a choice between calm and misery. It’s a moral choice. The situation will change in the near future— the sanctions trap will work—but not just now.

The calm is deceptive

The war against Ukraine and the possibility of peace is seen to be the property of Putin and only one part of Russian society. While Putin is president—and he will be a president as long as he lives—this war will continue.. The reason lies within Russia: Putin does not have a positive program for the country. External conflict is the basis of his power. It is a way to consolidate the elite and govern the people. Putin’s nuclear threats seem to have subsided, postponed for now. Perhaps the war against Ukraine will enter a phase of smoldering. But as long as Putin rules in Russia, the history of external conflict will continue.

After Putin—and Russian history has shown this—we will see great changes. I’m sure that the collective authorities will prefer to restore relations with the West. Trade brings more benefits than war. The historical events after Stalin and Tsar Nicholas I clearly demonstrated this truth. And Putin understands this. His response is to place the veterans of the “special military operation” in the parliament and other state institutions. We see the consistent indoctrination of children—not only teenagers, but even little children in the kindergartens. The Overton window of acceptability has become very wide (and wild). According to various estimates, between 18 percent (RussianField company) and 34 percent (Levada Center) of respondents consider nuclear strikes against Ukraine possible. Moreover, 64 percent believe that a nuclear war is winnable by Russia (RussianField company).

Until recently this was absolutely unthinkable. In the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era, and for the next 40 years, nuclear war was considered an absolute evil and the end of the human race. Such changes in the mass perception of Russian society create a threat for the future of everyone, including, of course, Russians. Russia has the greatest stock of A-bombs—circa 6000.(By comparison, the U.S. has 5400, China has 350, France has 290, and the U.K. has 225.)

One of the reasons why I was declared a “foreign agent” in Russia and stripped of my civil rights was because of my public statements against this madness. Of course, even the modern Russian leadership won’t make a decision to use nuclear weapons, but they create a culture and conditions for future generations of the Russian ruling class to consider this a normal working scenario.

The picture I have painted is challenging but not without a basis for building resistance to the madness and to the forces of war and destruction. Today we need the solidarity of all progressive forces and resistance to reaction . We must focus on educating people, because the current regime of imperial “greatness” can cost inexpressibly more than it did eighty years ago.


Featured Image credit: Иван Абатуров; modified by Tempest.

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Oleg Shein View All

Oleg Shein is a Russian historian, ex-President of the Russian Labour Confederation, and a former MP in the Russian State Duma from 1999 to 2021.