{"id":5719,"date":"2022-03-01T20:18:04","date_gmt":"2022-03-02T01:18:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.tempestmag.org\/v01_2020\/staging\/?p=5719"},"modified":"2022-03-04T22:16:57","modified_gmt":"2022-03-05T03:16:57","slug":"when-commonsense-fails","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2022\/03\/when-commonsense-fails\/","title":{"rendered":"When commonsense fails"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span class=\"dropcap\">\u201cC<\/span><em>ommon sense is a chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions, and one can find there anything that one likes.\u201d \u2013Antonio Gramsci<\/em><span title='Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International, 1973), 422.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>1<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'>Antonio Gramsci, <i>Selections from the Prison Notebooks<\/i> (New York: International, 1973), 422.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>In November of 2021, <em>Jacobin<\/em> magazine <a href=\"https:\/\/jacobinmag.com\/2021\/11\/common-sense-solidarity-working-class-voting-report\">announced<\/a> the findings of <a href=\"https:\/\/images.jacobinmag.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/08095656\/CWCPReport_CommonsenseSolidarity.pdf\">their study<\/a>, produced in conjunction with YouGov and the Center for Working-Class Politics<span title='\u00a0The Center for Working-Class Politics is described in the report as \u201ca research institution dedicated to projects including regular surveys of working-class voters, statistical analyses of elections and polling data, and the construction of a comprehensive database of progressive candidate demographics, strategy, and messaging. Its core mission is to study the relationship between working-class voters and progressive politics, in the belief that neither can achieve its ends without the other.\u201d At the time of this writing, the Center has no website or existence online. The domain, workingclasspolitics.org, was created two weeks prior to the report\u2019s release, and the registry of nonprofits shows no organization with this name. The domain, workingclasspolitics.org, directs to jacobinmag.org.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>2<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'>\u00a0The Center for Working-Class Politics is described in the report as \u201ca research institution dedicated to projects including regular surveys of working-class voters, statistical analyses of elections and polling data, and the construction of a comprehensive database of progressive candidate demographics, strategy, and messaging. Its core mission is to study the relationship between working-class voters and progressive politics, in the belief that neither can achieve its ends without the other.\u201d At the time of this writing, the <i>Center<\/i> has no website or existence online. The domain, workingclasspolitics.org, was created two weeks prior to the report\u2019s release, and the registry of nonprofits shows no organization with this name. The domain, workingclasspolitics.org, directs to jacobinmag.org.<\/span><\/span>, \u201cto survey working-class voting behavior in the United States.\u201d <em>Commonsense Solidarity: How a Working-Class Movement Can Be Built, and Maintained<\/em> uses data collected through a targeted survey in order to form conclusions about working-class dispositions and political preferences. The report\u2019s motivation is expressly for the purpose of electing Democrats who will need workers\u2019 votes if they hope to win in the future. <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em>\u2019s findings, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/11\/09\/briefing\/swing-voters-us-elections.html\">released to the New York Times<\/a> in advance of its summary and full release for <em>Jacobin<\/em>, aim to offer \u201cnew and powerful perspective on working-class political views.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Authors <a href=\"https:\/\/jacobinmag.com\/2020\/08\/the-two-paths-of-democratic-socialism-coalition-and-confrontation\">Jared Abbott<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/socialistforum.dsausa.org\/issues\/winter-2022\/how-can-the-left-win-in-working-class-america\/\">Leanne Fan<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/jacobinmag.com\/2020\/04\/third-party-bernie-sanders-democratic-socialism-elections\">Dustin Guastella<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2021\/02\/social-housing-public-affordable-california-maryland\">Galen Herz<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jacobinmag.com\/2021\/06\/second-gilded-age-class-politics-partisan-culture-war-identity\">Matthew Karp<\/a>, Jason Leach, John Marvel, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/politics\/working-class-voters-progressives\/\">Katherine Rader<\/a>, Faraz Riz, many affiliated with <em>Jacobin<\/em>, have produced a number of essays and journalistic pieces influential on the so-called \u201cnew socialist movement\u201d around Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)<span title='Dustin Guastella is known for writing other would-be statistical analyses that also fall flat upon closer scrutiny.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>3<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'>Dustin Guastella is known for writing other <a href=\"https:\/\/nonsite.org\/policing-symposium\/\">would-be statistical analyses<\/a> that also <a href=\"https:\/\/spectrejournal.com\/to-end-police-violence-end-racial-capitalism\/\">fall flat <\/a>upon closer scrutiny.<\/span><\/span>. They have now embarked on a new project to measure the attitudes of working-class people and determine \u2018what works to get progressives elected?\u2019<\/p>\n<p>Conceptually, this is a good development. Socialists can\u2019t rely on gut feelings and purely subjective assessments in understanding the world and ultimately changing it. In this regard, <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> represents a welcome attempt to give objective consideration to politics, to attitudes among our class, and to the search for openings that can build and prepare workers for the conquest of political power.<\/p>\n<p>And yet something is very wrong about <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em>. In design, construction, execution, and conclusion, the report is flawed if not willfully misleading. In what follows, we will explain <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> as it has been presented, investigate its methodology, test its claims, and consider the piece politically. While initially we expected the report to be full of confirmation bias, close examination of their method presents a different sort of problem: whether their conclusions are supported by their own data.<\/p>\n<h4>What\u2019s in the Report?<\/h4>\n<p>The report begins with a motivation: Democrats need the working class to win elections. The wave of \u201cprogressive Democrats\u201d (such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, and others) has largely been confined to urban centers, which the authors contend \u201chave been concentrated in well-educated, relatively high-income, and heavily Democratic districts.\u201d They then set out to find answers to some problems they pose: how can Democrats win over \u201cthe working class\u201d; can \u201cprogressives\u201d win outside urban liberal areas; and if so, how?<\/p>\n<p>From there, they explain that they have engaged in an \u201cexperimental study, the first of its kind\u201d in order to quantify the preferences of working-class <em>voters<\/em> in \u201cfive key swing states.\u201d The study \u201cnonrandom[ly]\u201d selected 2000 participants (400 each) in Nevada, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina (19). \u201cTo ensure we only surveyed working-class individuals\u201d the study selected respondents who were 1) not college educated; and 2) not self-identified Republicans.<\/p>\n<p>The experiment itself \u201ctest[ed] how working-class voters respond to head-to-head electoral matchups.\u201d Essentially, they created fictional politicians based on archetypes they devised, paired them against each other, and asked survey participants which they preferred and then to score them. These hypothetical politicians are differentiated by a number of variables: race, gender, policy positions, political affiliation, message delivery (\u201csoundbites\u201d or fictional statements delivered by these imagined candidates), and occupation.<\/p>\n<p>With the data collected, the report plotted values in pages of busy visuals and concluded that they represent the entire working class. The graphs are effective for the purpose of dazzling the viewer and lending a sense of authority to the authors\u2019 claims, but they are not particularly useful for conveying information or supporting their claims. All the same, the report declares that its method yields key takeaways about how Democrats can appeal to working-class voters:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li aria-level=\"1\">Focus on bread-and-butter economic issues<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\">Populist, \u201cclass-based\u201d messaging works as well as standard Democratic messaging<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\">Anti-racism is fine, but don\u2019t be \u201cwoke\u201d<\/li>\n<li aria-level=\"1\">Candidates should be Democrats, not independents<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The remainder of the report expands on these conclusions and elaborates their methodology.<\/p>\n<h4>Concepts<\/h4>\n<p>When you turn to data to answer political questions, the way you design that investigation matters. Specifically, how you select a sample and define core concepts determines whether you will receive valid, generalizable answers. <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> draws its nonrandom sample from a constrained universe of only five U.S. states and centers on three key concepts: social class, political affiliation, and political messaging. These are deployed inaccurately, inconsistently and in ways that appear to anticipate hoped-for conclusions.<\/p>\n<p>Social class is operationalized by the authors using educational attainment \u2013 \u201cthe preferred shorthand\u201d of media pundits \u2013 and \u201cworking class\u201d as all adults who don\u2019t hold a bachelor\u2019s degree (52). Respondents were selected only from this group. The authors acknowledge \u201cthe many limitations of this definition\u201d and later deploy a \u201crange of alternative measures\u201d but this does not solve the problem: education doesn\u2019t measure class because it doesn\u2019t identify (re)productive relationships (4). These include whether or not one owns property, purchases others\u2019 or sells their own labor power (or has it extorted), takes or gives orders at work, and so forth. College degrees may suggest those more likely to be managers, own a company, or be self-employed, but having one does not guarantee or define membership in these groups, as table 1 shows (below).<\/p>\n<p>Applying the census indicators \u201cclass of worker\u201d and \u201coccupation\u201d to nationwide workforce data, we see that large shares of non-BA holders are outside the most general definition of the working class\u2014non-managerial wage employees\u2014while the vast majority of BA holders remain within it. Educational attainment thus does not give a clear-cut picture of social classes; it instead yields vague descriptive strata that straddle class divides. All of <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em>\u2019s \u201ckey takeaways,\u201d however, are about the views or behavior of \u201cworking-class voters\u201d \u2013 claims which don\u2019t hold up when derived from a mixed-class sample, such as theirs (5-6).<\/p>\n<p>What makes this even stranger is that <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> deploys a different class identifier when constructing hypothetical candidates. These non-existent persons are defined by their occupation: \u201cTeacher,\u201d \u201cConstruction Worker,\u201d \u201cSmall Business Owner,\u201d \u201cCEO of Fortune 500 Company,\u201d and so on. Based on subjects\u2019 responses to these hypothetical candidates, the authors draw the conclusion that \u201c[w]orking-class voters prefer working-class candidates,\u201d (5). This claim is meaningless, however, because different notions of class are used for subjects and candidates. Its general thrust seems plausible, but the conceptual confusion of their data does not support it.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5720\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5720\" style=\"width: 623px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5720\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/table-1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"623\" height=\"192\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/table-1.png 623w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/table-1-600x185.png 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/table-1-300x92.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 623px) 100vw, 623px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5720\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Table 1: Education level by class of worker and managerial status; U.S. active workforce, 2019. Source: U.S. Census, American Community Survey 2019 1-year estimates.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The authors attempt to remedy the shortcomings of education-as-class with \u201cdifferent definitions\u201d later on: \u201cmanual vs. mental work,\u201d levels of \u201csupervision at work,\u201d \u201croutine vs. creative work,\u201d \u201cclass self-identification\u201d and a \u201cthree-dimensional variable for class\u201d derived from the first three and split into \u201cmiddle\u201d and \u201clower\u201d class subgroups (51, 54, 59, 61, 57, 63). While it is certainly admirable to explore these dimensions, all are applied within the same sample defined by the authors\u2019 original (and problematic) notion of class. These are not, therefore, different definitions of the working class but rather additional subcategories within the same educationally-defined stratum.<\/p>\n<p>Political identity and political messaging are also problematic. The authors of <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> \u201crestrict [their] sample to individuals who do not identify as Republicans.\u201d This is despite their stated interest in \u201cworking-class voters,\u201d a sizable share of whom<a href=\"https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/politics\/2020\/06\/02\/in-changing-u-s-electorate-race-and-education-remain-stark-dividing-lines\/\"> identify as Republican<\/a> and discordant with noted<a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/poq\/article\/83\/1\/91\/5494625\"> vote switching<\/a> across recent<a href=\"https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/politics\/2021\/06\/30\/behind-bidens-2020-victory\/\"> presidential elections<\/a> (19).<\/p>\n<p>On the candidate side, <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> constrains things differently. Republicans and \u201cgeneric Republican messaging\u201d are included but independents off the Democratic ballot are not (10). Given that a historically high share of U.S. adults say<a href=\"https:\/\/news.gallup.com\/poll\/329639\/support-third-political-party-high-point.aspx\"> a third party is needed<\/a>, that many<a href=\"https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2020\/11\/03\/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-most-developed-countries-in-voter-turnout\/\"> eligible voters don\u2019t vote<\/a>, and that independent or third-party candidates, including Bernie Sanders<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bernie_Sanders#Elections_2\"> in all of his non-presidential contests<\/a>, have either won or<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ross_Perot_1992_presidential_campaign\"> significantly impacted<\/a> general elections, this is a questionable assumption. These choices make for an oddly synthetic landscape: no Republicans among subjects and no independents among candidates. This does not yield a \u201cmore realistic portrait of voter attitudes,\u201d as the authors claim (5).<\/p>\n<p>And political messaging\u2013\u2013how the study\u2019s candidates \u201cspeak\u201d to issues\u2013\u2013is defined by a specious dichotomy between \u201cwokeness\u201d and economic populism. Study subjects were shown pairs of hypothetical candidates that varied on seven dimensions, one of which was \u201cmessaging style.\u201d \u201cEach communication style is delivered in the form of a hypothetical soundbite,\u201d the authors tell us, which \u201cdraw[s] on language and themes from actual political messaging\u2026and reflect the most important general strands of contemporary campaign rhetoric\u201d (10). They condense these into a five-point scale ranging from \u201cprogressive populist\u201d through \u201c\u2018woke\u2019 progressive,\u201d \u201c\u2018woke\u2019 moderate\u201d and \u201cmainstream moderate\u201d to \u201cRepublican\u201d (10).<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWokeness\u201d is a key differentiator here, but it is not a politically precise term. Broadly meaning \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Woke\">alert[ness] to racial prejudice and discrimination<\/a>\u201d and popularized by Black Lives Matter struggles, it is wholly compatible with economic, social, and political egalitarianism. At the hands of <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> authors, however, it is sectioned off as some contrary viewpoint. The alleged trade-off between economic \u201cpopulism\u201d and anti-racist \u201cwokeness\u201d then becomes a central theme\u2014indeed a core <em>finding<\/em>\u2014of their inquiry:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Progressives do not need to surrender questions of social justice to win working-class voters, but \u201cwoke,\u201d activist-inspired rhetoric is a liability. (5)<\/p>\n<p>Blue-collar workers are especially sensitive to candidate messaging \u2014 and respond even more acutely to the differences between populist and \u201cwoke\u201d language. (6)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>We should be skeptical. <em>Jacobin<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=MDO6x6u9PlI\"> editors<\/a> and<a href=\"https:\/\/theintercept.com\/2018\/08\/26\/beware-the-race-reductionist\/\"> affiliated authors<\/a> have clearly<a href=\"https:\/\/nonsite.org\/policing-symposium\/\"> staked<\/a> out a<a href=\"https:\/\/catalyst-journal.com\/2019\/12\/the-economic-origins-of-mass-incarceration\"> position<\/a>, developed long before this study,<a href=\"https:\/\/jacobinmag.com\/2018\/11\/democratic-socialism-class-organizing-racism-sexism\"> against<\/a> the centrality of antiracism to left coalition-building. That <em>Jacobin<\/em> now sponsors a study in which \u201cwokeness\u201d is manipulated into a narrow alternative to economic populism raises red flags\u2014and indeed \u201ctake[s] the bait\u201d of conservatives that<a href=\"https:\/\/jacobinmag.com\/2020\/06\/ross-douthat-nyt-racial-justice-protests-bernie-sanders\"> one <em>Jacobin<\/em> author<\/a> once warned against. Why should awareness of racial injustice be counterposed to redistributive economics when a<a href=\"https:\/\/www.haymarketbooks.org\/books\/736-how-capitalism-underdeveloped-black-america\"> very<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Poor_People%27s_Campaign\"> large<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.haymarketbooks.org\/books\/778-from-blacklivesmatter-to-black-liberation\"> share<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.commondreams.org\/views\/2015\/02\/02\/malcolm-x-was-right-about-america\"> of<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Rainbow_Coalition_(Fred_Hampton)\"> those<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2020\/06\/12\/opinion\/sunday\/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html\"> voicing<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.salon.com\/2020\/06\/23\/tax-the-rich-and-defund-the-police-nurses-union-pushes-for-post-pandemic-shift-_partner\/\"> the<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.versobooks.com\/books\/2426-the-end-of-policing\"> first<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.labornotes.org\/blogs\/2020\/07\/chicago-unions-demand-defund-police-and-fund-health-care-all\"> also<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.penguinrandomhouse.com\/books\/37354\/women-race-and-class-by-angela-y-davis\/\"> voice<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/rampantmag.com\/2020\/07\/the-abolitionist-road-to-socialism\/\"> the<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/uncpress.org\/book\/9781469625485\/hammer-and-hoe\/\"> second<\/a>, and when the study\u2019s truncated \u201cwoke\u201d soundbites belie the<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/ayannapressley\/status\/1013184081696346113?lang=en\"> actual statements<\/a> of their real-life inspirations?<span title='\u201c[T]he woke progressive\u201d archetype of Commonsense Solidarity, according to its authors, \u201cborrows rhetoric from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ayanna Pressley\u201d (10).' class='inline-footnote' style=''>4<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'>\u201c[T]he woke progressive\u201d archetype of <i>Commonsense Solidarity, <\/i>according to its authors, \u201cborrows rhetoric from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ayanna Pressley\u201d (10).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>This kind of misrepresentation casts a shadow over the study\u2019s design and the authors\u2019 interpretation of what subjects\u2019 choices mean \u2013 redistribution <em>over<\/em> racial justice, as if the two were exclusive.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\"><em>Jacobin<\/em> editors and affiliated authors have clearly staked out a position, developed long before this study, against the centrality of antiracism to left coalition-building.<\/aside>\n<h4>Analysis<\/h4>\n<p>Let us pretend for a moment that <em>Commonsense Solidarity\u2019<\/em>s muddled notions of class, party, and messaging are unimportant. Would its conclusions hold up? Does the study have what researchers call \u201cinternal validity\u201d \u2013 plausible support for its claims in its findings? Our deeper dive reveals that it does not.<\/p>\n<p>The report makes use of a quasi-experimental technique known as conjoint analysis. Without getting too technical, what this effectively does is allow for simultaneous and differentiated assessment of the factors driving individual choice. These could be almost anything: brands of cereal, immigration policies, or political candidates, just to name a few. Overall, <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> makes appropriate use of conjoint analysis and its authors even heed <a href=\"https:\/\/ora.ox.ac.uk\/objects\/uuid:febe9ba9-1035-4e89-ba36-8ac062cb069c\/download_file?file_format=pdf&amp;safe_filename=MeasuringSubgroupPreferences.pdf&amp;type_of_work=Journal+article\">warnings <\/a>to use \u201cmarginal means\u201d rather than \u201caverage marginal component effects\u201d when reporting their results.<\/p>\n<p>Yet they fail to heed their own advice and a basic rule of statistical reasoning. In walking readers through that labyrinth, the authors state:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The bars around each dot indicate how confident we are that a given value is correct. Each bar to the left and right of the dot indicates the margin of error for a given estimate\u2026It is important to note that if the bars overlap with the vertical line at .5, we cannot conclude that respondents had a net positive or a net negative opinion of that characteristic (since there is no significant difference between the value of the dot and .5).<\/p>\n<p>Similarly, <em>if the bars around one dot overlap with the bars around another dot, we cannot conclude that there is any statistical difference between the two characteristics<\/em>. (23, emphasis added)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>More straightforwardly, overlapping bars for two or more elements means there is no difference between them. It cannot be inferred that one exists, especially not among all \u201cworking-class voters\u201d as the authors mistakenly do.<\/p>\n<p>On page 27 they state, \u201cyounger respondents did tend to prefer progressive soundbites over their moderate counterparts.\u201d This is in reference to their chart below (Figure 1). Four of the five red bars\u2013\u2013the margins of error for \u201cyounger respondents\u201d (ages 18-44) on all but the Republican soundbite\u2013\u2013overlap heavily. On three of the five messaging styles (\u201cwoke moderate,\u201d \u201cmainstream moderate\u201d and \u201cpopulist progressive\u201d) the error bars for all three age groups also overlap within and across soundbites. This means there is <em>no statistical difference<\/em> between them and thus no support for the authors\u2019 statement that younger respondents \u201cprefer\u201d any of the non-Republican styles over any other.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5721\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5721\" style=\"width: 600px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5721\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"600\" height=\"467\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-1.png 690w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-1-600x467.png 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-1-300x233.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5721\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Figure 1<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The same issue arises in the following breakdown of racial groups. There the authors state:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>White respondents narrowly preferred the progressive populist soundbite over the mainstream moderate\u2026black respondents narrowly preferred the progressive populist messaging over the woke progressive\u2026and Latino respondents preferred the mainstream moderate rhetoric\u2026But these differences were all relatively small. (27)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In fact, they were non-existent. All error bars for these rhetorical \u201cpreferences\u201d overlap, which means they aren\u2019t preferences or aversions. Statistically speaking, white respondents preferred \u201cwoke moderate,\u201d \u201cmainstream moderate\u201d and \u201cpopulist progressive\u201d messaging <em>equally <\/em>over their \u201cwoke progressive\u201d and Republican counterparts. Black respondents preferred all non-Republican messaging styles <em>equally <\/em>to that one, and the same goes for Latinx respondents. Again, we have an unsupported leap from statistical sameness to narrative difference.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5722\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5722\" style=\"width: 600px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5722\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"600\" height=\"522\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-2.png 630w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-2-600x522.png 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-2-300x261.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5722\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Figure 2<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>In comparing the attitudes of class-like subgroups toward these same five messaging styles, the authors repeat their error. \u201cPopulist rhetoric,\u201d they claim, \u201cproved particularly strong compared to other types of campaign messaging among respondents who make less money, are not supervisors, perform manual labor, and who self-identify as working-class\u201d (30). \u201cOur results,\u201d they conclude, \u201cshow that these working-class subgroups preferred a class-based appeal with considerably more enthusiasm than other respondents\u201d (30). Yet even a cursory review of these results shows heavy error-bar overlap\u2013\u2013that is, <em>non-difference<\/em>\u2013\u2013among these subgroups (Figure 3). Respondents from all three income groups and \u201cskill levels\u201d equally preferred \u201cwoke moderate,\u201d \u201cmainstream moderate,\u201d and \u201cpopulist progressive\u201d messaging styles. So did those who self-identified as \u201clow income,\u201d \u201cworking class,\u201d \u201clower-middle class,\u201d and \u201cupper-middle class.\u201d And both supervisors and non-supervisors preferred \u201cmainstream moderate\u201d and \u201cpopulist progressive\u201d styles <em>equally<\/em>. Put plainly, this evidence does not support the authors\u2019 claims.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5723\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5723\" style=\"width: 377px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5723\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-3.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"377\" height=\"820\" data-wp-editing=\"1\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-3.png 377w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/figure-3-138x300.png 138w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 377px) 100vw, 377px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5723\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Figure 3<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Ultimately, this amounts to an argumentative fallacy: inferring from non-significant differences that subjects or subgroups differ. The authors know this and advise their readers accordingly. Yet they offer such claims repeatedly throughout their 53-page results section, never limiting their import to the study\u2019s five-state sampling universe but rather generalizing to the entire U.S. working class. Such claims should be discarded, as well as most of the report\u2019s summary \u201ctakeaways.\u201d<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">Like most liberal progressives, the <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> authors assume that Democrats are the natural home for workers and make this clear in refusing to offer independents as hypothetical candidates. The takeaway is to compete for a limited pool of voters who may be inclined to vote Democrat.<\/aside>\n<h4>Politics<\/h4>\n<p><em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> presents itself as revealing important information about how to win working-class votes for a progressive, Democratic electoral project. It has two audiences: Democratic Party operatives, to whom they appeal to shift their electoral strategy; and a broad left, who they wish to win to their conclusions about remaining in the Democratic Party, using \u201ceconomic populist\u201d messaging and avoiding \u201cwokeness.\u201d Even among skeptics who may disagree with the particulars, <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em>\u2019s status as a <em>report<\/em>, relying on data, visualizations, and experimental methodology, make it more persuasive than an essay would likely be.<\/p>\n<p>The issue is that when you look under the hood, it\u2019s a lemon. For a report that attempts to extrapolate the preferences of the entire U.S. working class, <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> is unconvincing on its own terms. It uses a transparently non-representative sample that excludes <em>most <\/em>of the class based on geography, as well as large sections of it based on education and political affiliation (identifying as Republican); it deploys biased or simply faulty indicators of class, political messaging, and political affiliation; and it inserts findings of difference where none statistically exist. The authors end up not being able to say much of anything, yet they still present their study as if it backs up claims that several of them have argued for years. The conclusions are what appear to matter here, and the authors fudge the numbers in service of a particular project: \u201cnational political realignment on progressive terms\u201d (3), or in other words, Democratic Party realignment.<\/p>\n<p>From top to bottom, <em>Commonsense Solidarity <\/em>uses flawed reasoning. For one, it presents political affiliation as essentially fixed: Republicans will simply always be Republicans, and there\u2019s no use including them when considering how to attract working-class votes (10, sub 14). This assumes both that political identity is immutable, and that working-class Republicans are not expressing any sectional class interest in aligning with <em>the other<\/em> party of capital. Like most liberal progressives, the <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> authors assume that Democrats are the natural home for workers and make this clear in refusing to offer independents as hypothetical candidates. The takeaway is to compete for a limited pool of voters who may be inclined to vote Democrat. In that way, they remain limited to a Gramscian \u201ccommon sense\u201d and never <a href=\"https:\/\/socialistworker.co.uk\/socialist-review-archive\/common-sense-good-sense\/\">plot a course<\/a> to \u201cgood sense.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Beyond that, they perceive voter behavior simply as a product of individual preference. This is standard rational-choice liberalism: suggesting voters weigh desires then express them by endorsing the most fitting candidates on the ballot box. <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> tries to see what those preferences are (allegedly economic populism) and then sets out to prove that if working-class voters were given the opportunity, they would simply pursue them. But voter behavior in bourgeois democracies is not a straightforward result of personal preferences. Money, power, manufactured consent, and political calculations play significant roles in determining who people vote for. Famously, voters in South Carolina, who overwhelmingly <a href=\"https:\/\/nymag.com\/intelligencer\/2020\/01\/medicare-for-all-is-popular-in-south-carolina-new-poll-says.html\">favored Medicare for All<\/a>, voted not for Bernie Sanders, the policy\u2019s main proponent, but <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2020\/02\/29\/us\/politics\/joe-biden-south-carolina-primary.html\">for Joe Biden<\/a>. The fantasy game that <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em> plays is hoping to pair the structural power of the Democratic Party with the favored candidates of DSA thought leaders and getting \u201cthe Left\u201d behind it.<\/p>\n<p>There are more realistic left alternatives. They involve casting aside the Democratic Party and <a href=\"https:\/\/spectrejournal.com\/beyond-electoralism\/\">formal elections<\/a> as primary sites of struggle in favor of <a href=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2022\/01\/the-u-s-left-at-a-strategic-impasse\/\">social movements and independent organizing.<\/a> Equally large <a href=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2021\/09\/the-outlines-of-opposition-in-a-post-trump-u-s-a\/\">practical questions<\/a> hang over them as they do over <em>Commonsense Solidarity<\/em>\u2019s realignment strategy. And they share a fundamental one: \u201chow a working-class coalition can be built.\u201d We should investigate these questions thoroughly, both as researchers and as activists, using all relevant tools. But we should do so accurately, without leaping toward answers the data doesn\u2019t provide. This cannot be said for <em>Jacobin<\/em>\u2019s initial foray into empirical research.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This article was originally published in Spectre Journal. The following is an edited version, condensed for readability. The full-text can be <a href=\"https:\/\/spectrejournal.com\/when-common-sense-fails\/\">read here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":135,"featured_media":5728,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[59,204,289,290,288],"class_list":["post-5719","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-class","tag-class-reductionism","tag-critique","tag-jacobin","tag-statistics"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/commonsensefailsnotitle.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5719","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/135"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5719"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5719\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5728"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5719"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5719"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5719"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}