{"id":4083,"date":"2021-09-11T14:04:07","date_gmt":"2021-09-11T18:04:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.tempestmag.org\/v01_2020\/staging\/?p=4083"},"modified":"2021-09-21T11:59:29","modified_gmt":"2021-09-21T15:59:29","slug":"twenty-years-since-9-11","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2021\/09\/twenty-years-since-9-11\/","title":{"rendered":"Twenty years since 9\/11"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span class=\"dropcap\">A<\/span>fter nearly twenty years of war and occupation in Afghanistan, U.S. armed forces finally completed their withdrawal on August 31, leaving the country in the hands of the Taliban, the organization that it had removed from power when the U.S. originally invaded in October 2001. Just a few weeks earlier, President Joe Biden had told a press conference that there were no significant parallels between the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its final withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. He added that \u201cthe likelihood there\u2019s going to be the Taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But by the time the U.S. left, the Taliban was back in control. And the chaotic scenes at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul in the weeks leading up to the U.S. departure reminded many of the desperate panic at the U.S. embassy in Saigon forty-six years before.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, there are also many differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan. Facile analogies should be avoided. But by any measure, this was an ignominious defeat for the world\u2019s most powerful military nation, only days before the twentieth anniversary of the September 11 attacks.<\/p>\n<p>When members of al Qaeda hijacked four planes and flew three of them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington D.C. (the fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after its passengers fought back), anti-war activists in the United States raised the slogan \u201cDon\u2019t Turn Tragedy into War.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Some of us also pointed out that however unjustifiable the attacks, the U.S. government itself bore its own share of responsibility for them because of its long-term imperialist meddling in both the Middle East and Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_4090\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4090\" style=\"width: 1024px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-4090\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-1024x667.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"667\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-1024x667.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-scaled-600x391.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-300x195.jpg 300w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-768x500.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-1536x1001.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-2048x1334.jpg 2048w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-1200x782.jpg 1200w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/pentagon-on-9-11-1-1800x1173.jpg 1800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-4090\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Pentagon 9\/12\/01; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/ndguard\/6076601905\/in\/photostream\/\">Photo<\/a> by North Dakota National Guard<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>In April 1978, the pro-Soviet People\u2019s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power following a military coup. It attempted to rapidly introduce a series of social reforms, but while its cadre may have had the best of intentions, they had little support in the country at large. Its efforts produced a backlash, particularly in rural areas, which soon led to armed clashes.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. government, still stinging from its defeat in Vietnam, saw an opportunity. From the summer of 1979, it began <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Cyclone\">secretly funneling support<\/a> to government opponents. According to Jimmy Carter\u2019s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brezinski:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u2026it was July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention\u2026. We didn\u2019t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>With the country spiraling towards civil war and a power struggle breaking out between different factions of the PDPA, the Soviet Union sent in troops in December 1979 to prop up a friendly government on its border. That same day Brezinski sent Carter a letter: \u201cWe now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In effect, that is what happened. The Soviet occupation lasted for over nine years. It was a brutal and bloody affair, which left over one million Afghans dead. But just like the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviets were never able to defeat the rebels, who called themselves \u201cmujahideen\u201d or holy warriors, and who received billions of dollars of aid from Washington, first from Carter and then from Reagan.<\/p>\n<p>The CIA also encouraged tens of thousands of Islamic radicals to come to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. They received training and weapons from the Pakistani security services, paid for by U.S. taxpayers.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. knew it was backing reactionary forces, but it was willing to do so to win the Cold War. And it worked. The occupation was a huge financial burden for Moscow, which finally withdrew in February 1989. Most commentators think that the impact of the war played a significant role in the collapse of the Soviet government two years later.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">\u2026 the chaotic scenes at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul in the weeks leading up to the U.S. departure reminded many of the desperate panic at the U.S. embassy in Saigon forty-six years before.<\/aside>\n<p>U.S. officials broke out the champagne when Soviet troops left Afghanistan, but they left behind a country in virtual anarchy, with rival factions of the mujahideen fighting amongst themselves and a Soviet-installed president, Muhammed Najibullah, under siege in Kabul. The city finally fell to one mujahideen group in 1992. Najibullah was executed but the civil war continued until 1996 when the Taliban, a new force with its own highly rigid interpretation of Islam, took over an exhausted country with support from Pakistan.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. had won the Cold War, but it had also created a huge network of Islamic radicals trained in guerrilla tactics. One of the first non-Afghan volunteers to join the ranks of the mujahideen was Osama bin Laden, a civil engineer and businessman from a wealthy construction family in Saudi Arabia, with close ties to members of the Saudi royal family.<\/p>\n<p>Bin Laden recruited 4,000 volunteers from his own country and developed close relations with the most radical mujahideen leaders. He also worked closely with the CIA, raising money from private Saudi citizens.<\/p>\n<p>According to the Indian journalist Rahul Bhedi, \u201cIn 1988, with U.S. knowledge, bin Laden created Al-Qaeda (The Base): a conglomerate of quasi-independent Islamic terrorist cells spread across at least 26 countries. Washington turned a blind eye to Al-Qaeda, confident that it would not directly impinge on the U.S.\u201d Instead, during the 1990s, the network that the U.S. had helped create was linked to terrorist attacks in the Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, France, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, as well as on U.S. targets.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThis is an insane instance of the chickens coming home to roost,\u201d one U.S. diplomat in Pakistan told the Los Angeles Times. \u201cYou can\u2019t plug billions of dollars into an anti-Communist jihad, accept participation from all over the world and ignore the consequences. But we did.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The CIA had its own name for this phenomenon: blowback.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_4091\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4091\" style=\"width: 640px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-4091\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Hamid-Karzai-and-donald-Rumsfeld.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"640\" height=\"427\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Hamid-Karzai-and-donald-Rumsfeld.jpg 640w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Hamid-Karzai-and-donald-Rumsfeld-600x400.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Hamid-Karzai-and-donald-Rumsfeld-300x200.jpg 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-4091\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Hamid Karzai, post-U.S. occupation President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, May 1, 2003; <a href=\"https:\/\/nara.getarchive.net\/media\/democratic-republic-of-afghanistan-president-hamid-karzai-left-shakes-hands-f29f01\">Photo<\/a> by Helene C. Stikkel.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>For the family members of the victims, the 9\/11 attacks were a tragedy, but for the Bush administration and the U.S. ruling class, they were a golden opportunity.<\/p>\n<p>Bush had come into office with the goal of reasserting U.S. power in the Middle East, starting with regime change in Iraq. In his book The Price of Loyalty, Bush\u2019s first Treasury Secretary, Paul O\u2019Neill, later revealed that discussions about invading Iraq began taking place in cabinet meetings in February 2001. What was needed was a pretext to do so.<\/p>\n<p>According to insider reports from Richard Clarke, the administration\u2019s \u201ccounter-terrorism czar\u201d, and Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, within hours of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were trying to use them as an excuse to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein.<\/p>\n<p>They were soon persuaded, however, that Iraq was a bridge too far. What they could get away with immediately was building an international coalition to invade Afghanistan. The plan was that this could then serve as a stepping-stone for a later attack on Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the public justification for the war was that the Taliban government was harboring Osama bin Laden, the alleged \u201cmastermind\u201d of the September 11 attacks. But the Bush administration was never serious about capturing bin Laden, who was much more useful as a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/worldnews\/northamerica\/usa\/1475515\/Bush-takes-a-six-point-lead-after-new-bin-Laden-tape.html\">bogeyman<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Soon after the attacks, Taliban government officials announced that they would <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2001\/oct\/14\/afghanistan.terrorism5\">extradite bin Laden<\/a> to stand trial if, in accordance with international law, the U.S. government would provide evidence of his involvement. Secretary of State Colin Powell promised to issue a dossier documenting bin Laden\u2019s role, but the dossier never appeared.<\/p>\n<p>In late September and early October, political leaders in Pakistan proposed extraditing bin Laden to their country, where he could be tried by an international tribunal, but this plan was dismissed by the U.S. government.<\/p>\n<p>The Australian journalist John Pilger quoted the response of one U.S. official: \u201ccasting our objectives too narrowly\u201d risked \u201ca premature collapse of the international effort if by some lucky chance Mr. bin Laden was captured.\u201d In other words, the U.S. was not interested in bin Laden or other al Qaeda leaders being handed over, because this would remove the rationale to invade Afghanistan, which the Bush administration was hell-bent on doing.<\/p>\n<p>The claim made by Bush, and later repeated by Obama, that the U.S. had no choice but to invade Afghanistan was a transparent lie.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">One of the first non-Afghan volunteers to join the ranks of the mujahideen was Osama bin Laden, a civil engineer and businessman from a wealthy construction family in Saudi Arabia, with close ties to members of the Saudi royal family.<\/aside>\n<p>The initial invasion was a one-sided rout. The Taliban was quickly swept aside, and the U.S. and its allies began the process of trying to construct a stable government that would be beholden to U.S. interests.<\/p>\n<p>Almost as soon as the first phase of the war was over, the Bush administration began turning its attention to Iraq, first by making utterly implausible claims that Iraq\u2019s President Saddam Hussein was in league with al Qaeda, then by spreading the lie that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction and claiming that this justified a preemptive attack.<\/p>\n<p>Why the almost fanatical focus on Iraq? The most obvious answer was oil. \u201cRegardless of whether we say so publicly,\u201d said Anthony H. Cordesman, then as now an analyst at Washington\u2019s Center for Strategic and International Studies, \u201cwe will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world\u2019s oil reserves.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Shortly after taking office, the Bush administration commissioned a study from the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston\u2019s Rice University\u2014a think-tank run by James Baker III, Secretary of State for Bush senior, with an array of advisers from major energy and oil companies. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/report\/strategic-energy-policy-challenges-21st-century\">report<\/a>, Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For the 21st Century, was issued in April 2001. It warned that the U.S. faced \u201cunprecedented energy price volatility\u201d and concluded:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a destabilizing influence \u2026 to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. Therefore the U.S. should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq including military, energy, economic and political\/diplomatic assessments.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This was followed in May, with an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nrc.gov\/docs\/ML0428\/ML042800056.pdf\">energy report<\/a> from the office of Vice President Cheney, which stated that the U.S. was increasingly dependent on imported oil and that it might be necessary to overcome foreign resistance to gain access to new supplies. The political scientist Michael Klare summed up the administration\u2019s position as follows:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>American efforts to obtain increased supplies of foreign oil will require more than trade deals and diplomacy\u2014it will also require the threat of or the use of force to dissuade hostile forces from attempting to obstruct the flow of petroleum to the United States. This, in turn, will require an enhanced U.S. capacity to operate militarily in areas of likely fighting over oil&#8230;. And while these efforts have been accelerated since September 11, it is important to note that they began well before that date.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>While an invasion of Iraq would certainly disrupt production and cause a sharp spike in the price of oil, the Bush administration bet that this would be a temporary phenomenon. With a U.S.-puppet regime installed in Baghdad, the hope was that within a few years there would be an abundant supply of cheap oil on the world market. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2002\/nov\/03\/iraq.oil\">According to Lawrence Lindsey<\/a>, Bush\u2019s former economic adviser, \u201cWhen there is a regime change in Iraq, you could add three to five million barrels [per day] of production to world supply. The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the economy.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Donald Kagan, a member of the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a think tank with close ties to the Bush administration, put it even <a href=\"https:\/\/www.motherjones.com\/politics\/2003\/03\/thirty-year-itch\/\">more bluntly<\/a>: \u201cWhen we have economic problems, it\u2019s been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But it was not mainly a question of securing oil for the U.S. itself. Europe, Japan and China were far more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the U.S. A military occupation of Iraq would thus intended to give Washington increased leverage over its main economic rivals. Moreover, U.S. control of Iraqi oil would undermine the power of the OPEC cartel, which had long been a goal of U.S. foreign policy.<\/p>\n<p>But oil was only part of the picture. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the U.S. had been left as the world\u2019s only superpower. Maintaining this dominant position and preventing the emergence of a new global rival\u2014in particular, China\u2014now became a central goal of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, with Washington willing to use its military strength to ensure that it remained the dominant global power for the indefinite future.<\/p>\n<p>The strategy was laid out in a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wanttoknow.info\/020907sundayherald.pnac\">document<\/a> written by the PNAC in September 2000, which called for \u201cmaintaining global US pre-eminence \u2026 and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.\u201d This would include using overwhelming military force to take control of the Gulf region, with its strategically vital oil resources.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">The fact that the government of Ashraf Ghani and the Afghan military collapsed like a house of cards was final proof of the folly of the whole enterprise.<\/aside>\n<p>But the report also noted that to implement such aggressive policies, \u201csome catastrophic and catalyzing event\u2014like a new Pearl Harbor\u201d would be needed. From that perspective the 9\/11 attacks offered the Bush administration a golden opportunity to put into effect plans that it already wanted to pursue.<\/p>\n<p>Afghanistan, as noted, was seen as a stepping-stone to Iraq and the Gulf, but it was also important for other strategic reasons. The Marxist political analyst Gilbert Achcar noted at the time:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[T]he ideological framework created by 9\/11 and the Afghanistan war provided an opportunity to establish a direct military presence not only in Afghanistan but in Central Asia, which, strategically speaking, is considerably more important. Countries like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where the United States set up air bases after 9\/11, lie in the heart of the former Soviet Union. If you add to this the U.S. involvement in the Caucasus, you see that Washington is trying to set a military vise around the Caspian Basin, which is an important source of hydrocarbons, not only oil but especially gas.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Washington also hoped that a U.S. military presence at \u201cthe heart of the landmass extending from European Russia to China\u201d would serve to keep both these rivals in check.<\/p>\n<p>If these were the United States\u2019 goals, it has failed to achieve them quite spectacularly. Far from keeping Russia and China in check, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq trapped the U.S. in a quagmire. At the end of two decades, Russia and especially China have not been weakened, but have emerged as more powerful military and economic competitors.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the two occupied countries, along with other parts of the Middle East, have been devastated by U.S. intervention. A recent <a href=\"https:\/\/watson.brown.edu\/costsofwar\/figures\/2021\/BudgetaryCosts\">report<\/a> from the Costs of War Project at Brown University estimated that between 897,000 and 929,000 people have been killed as a result of the U.S. \u201cWar on Terror.\u201d Of these, the vast majority were from Afghanistan or Iraq, and at least 387,000 were civilians, the majority women and children. Other estimates put the numbers even higher.<\/p>\n<p>The total cost of these wars has been over $8 trillion\u2014a vast expenditure for a series of imperialist adventures that from the U.S. government\u2019s own point of view have left it weaker, not stronger.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_4092\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4092\" style=\"width: 1024px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-4092\" src=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin-1024x632.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"632\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin-1024x632.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin-600x370.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin-300x185.jpg 300w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin-768x474.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/resized-xi-and-putin.jpg 1100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-4092\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">U.S. imperial efforts in southwest Asia have failed to slow down the rise of Russia and China as military and economic competitors. <a href=\"http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/57696\">Photo<\/a> by Presidential Press and Information Office (Russia)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The occupation of Afghanistan was characterized by twenty years of \u201cchaos, corruption, and violence,\u201d in the words of Ali M. Latifi, a freelance journalist based in the country. By early 2002, the Taliban had been virtually destroyed, but U.S. indifference to Afghani lives allowed it to gradually make a comeback.<\/p>\n<p>Biden\u2019s decision to withdraw troops was based on the calculation that the occupation was no longer serving U.S. imperial interests. There was also a miscalculation that the U.S.-backed government in Kabul would be able to hold out at least until the U.S. had left. The fact that the government of Ashraf Ghani and the Afghan military collapsed like a house of cards was final proof of the folly of the whole enterprise.<\/p>\n<p>In a speech at the end of August, Biden claimed that the U.S. government had learned the lessons of Afghanistan. In reality, it has learned nothing. The withdrawal from Afghanistan represents not the end of U.S. imperialism, but simply a new phase, in which the administration intends to prioritize great power competition with Russia and China.<\/p>\n<p>Obama attempted but failed to make a \u201cpivot to Asia\u201d during his second term. Biden hopes that disentangling from Afghanistan will allow him to succeed where Obama did not. Whether or not he can complete the shift remains an open question.<\/p>\n<p>Following the suicide bombings outside the Kabul airport in the final days of the withdrawal, the New York Times <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/08\/27\/us\/politics\/cia-afghanistan.html\">reported<\/a> that history had \u201cgot in the way\u201d of U.S. attempts to extricate itself from Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>American officials are reworking plans to counter threats that could emerge from Afghanistan\u2019s chaos, according to current and former officials: negotiating for new bases in Central Asian countries; determining how clandestine officers can run sources in the country without the military and diplomatic outposts that provided cover to spies for two decades; and figuring out from where the C.I.A. could launch drone strikes and other Afghanistan operations.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>For the rest of us, neither scenario\u2014continued U.S. covert involvement in Afghanistan or a successful \u201cpivot to Asia\u201d\u2014is anything to cheer about. The latter would simply increase the chances of military confrontation between the U.S. and China, while making the kind of global cooperation needed to address the climate crisis less likely.<\/p>\n<p>In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was at the peak of its power. It could have used the immense wealth and resources at its disposal to improve the lives of people around the world and to address major international problems. But that would have required not just better leaders, but the creation of an economic system in which human need and environmental sustainability, not the endless pursuit of profit, are the primary goals.<\/p>\n<p>Imperialist wars in the Middle East and elsewhere, blowback like the 9\/11 attacks, the new cold war with China, and the death spiral towards climate catastrophe, are the rotten fruits of capitalism. If we want to end them, we will have to replace the system that is their underlying cause.<\/p>\n<p><small>Featured image credit: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bornagainlabor.com\/\">BALM Agit-Prop<\/a>.<\/small><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On the twentieth anniversary of the 9\/11 attacks, <strong>Phil Gasper <\/strong>explains the historical relationship between U.S. imperialism and the jihadist groups in the Middle East. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":41,"featured_media":4096,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[35,34,33,76],"class_list":["post-4083","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-anti-imperialism","tag-imperialism","tag-international-solidarity","tag-u-s-politics"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/911-tempest-copy.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4083","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/41"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4083"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4083\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4096"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4083"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4083"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4083"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}