{"id":15150,"date":"2026-09-22T16:19:09","date_gmt":"2026-09-22T20:19:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/?p=15097"},"modified":"2026-10-04T23:49:55","modified_gmt":"2026-10-05T03:49:55","slug":"workers-will-fight-for-their-self-interest","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2026\/09\/workers-will-fight-for-their-self-interest\/","title":{"rendered":"Workers will fight for their self-interest"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span class=\"dropcap\">T<\/span>here aren\u2019t very many Marxists around today who would defend central planning as practiced in the Soviet Union from the late 1920s through the 1980s. But there are many who still think some form of central planning is essential to socialism. Marxist Sociology Professor, <em>Catalyst<\/em> editor and podcaster Vivek Chibber isn\u2019t one of them. In an aptly titled\u00a0 <a href=\"https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2026\/05\/central-planning-soviet-union-socialism\">recent interview<\/a>, \u201cSocialism Has a Future. Central Planning Doesn\u2019t\u201d, he explained his position.<\/p>\n<p>Chibber\u2019s critique is based on the top-down, bureaucratic planning as it was practiced in the Soviet Union. As he notes, aside from its clones in Eastern Europe, North Korea, and, for a time China, there is no other actual existing model of central planning to examine. His argument is complex but boils down to the proposition that in an economy of any significant size where there is no market there are simply too many materials, inputs, and products for any commission or central authority to allocate efficiently. Only a competitive market could do this, according to Chibber. Hence misallocation, breakdowns, waste, poor products, wrong incentives, and the inevitable accumulation of these\u00a0 problems lead to a crisis of the system. No doubt this pretty much describes what actually happened in the Soviet Union and its satellites.<\/p>\n<p>Chibber argues that these are unavoidable features of any centrally planned economy. Before we accept this, and with it the notion that only \u201cmarket socialism\u201d provides a workable model for the future socialist society we seek, we need to look more closely into the Soviet model and the society in which it played out. What is most glaringly absent in Chibber\u2019s general description of the Russian model is the social reality of the Soviet Union from the late 1920s to the bitter end\u2014above all the question of social class. This is all the more remarkable because Chibber is an ardent advocate of the almost exclusive centrality of \u201cclass analysis\u201d when it comes to contemporary politics.<\/p>\n<p>Socialism is the rule of the working class. Planning is an instrument of the democratic workers\u2019 state for organizing production for human need under its collective political and social rule and the transition to a classless society. While the Soviet Union promoted itself as socialist and in the transition to a classless society, it was anything but. It was, in fact, a highly stratified and bureaucratized society.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">Socialism is the rule of the working class. Planning is an instrument of the democratic workers\u2019 state for organizing production for human need under its collective political and social rule\u2026While the Soviet Union promoted itself as socialist and in the transition to a classless society\u2026It was, in fact, a highly stratified and bureaucratized society.<\/aside>\n<p>By the late 1930s anti-Stalinist Marxists began to question whether the USSR was still any sort of workers\u2019 state, degenerated, deformed or otherwise. Many, mostly in the Trotskyist tradition, though not Trotsky himself, concluded that since there was no longer even a shred of workers\u2019 democracy or the right to dissent, to organize for change, or form independent unions, much less to exert influence on the state\u2019s economic priorities, that the bureaucracy that controlled the state was in fact a new ruling class. This bureaucracy controlled the means of production and collectively hired and directed the Soviet workforce.\u00a0 Some called it state capitalism (C.L.R. James, Tony Cliff) some bureaucratic collectivist or state collectivist (Joseph Carter, Max Shachtman, Hal Draper, Big Flame). Like good Marxists, they <a href=\"https:\/\/www.haymarketbooks.org\/books\/868-western-marxism-and-the-soviet-union\">fiercely debated these differences<\/a>, but all saw Russia and its offsprings as class societies.<\/p>\n<p>This had enormous implications. For one, this new ruling class won and maintained its class position and power through the most ruthless means. Workers\u2019 democracy was suppressed, no party other than the ruling Communist Party was permitted, no factions within the party were allowed, no free press, or rights to assembly, no independent unions. The potential penalty for active dissent was forced labor, the Gulag, or the firing squad. It was, in a real sense, a totalitarian society.<\/p>\n<p>Chibber admits its \u201cauthoritarian\u201d nature made things worse but insists it was not a basic cause, which was the lack of competition. In contrast, as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/etol\/newspape\/wl\/wl3-40.pdf#page=19\">Hal Draper wrote<\/a> when the Soviet Union was at the peak of its power and influence in the early 1950s:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The Stalinist state has an economic plan. Like everything else in this totalitarian structure, it is a plan devised, imposed and enforced from above, bureaucratically. But no bureaucratic commission can itself plan such a labyrinth of social processes. Such a plan must be constantly checked from below, corrected from below; it must depend on initiative and responsibility below; it must be self-correcting through the give-and-take of democratic planning between the lower and upper echelons on every level.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>And these were just what it lacked. Note that Draper wasn\u2019t just talking about the millions of materials to be allocated to thousands of enterprises but the social processes between the various levels of planning: the central commission (GOSPLAN), regional commissions, industry, enterprise, the people who ran or worked for them, and the role of the party at every point. Of course, there was feed-back between various levels, but as Chibber points out almost everyone lied about shortages, resources, profits, etc. It wasn\u2019t lack of competition that led to misallocations and lies, it was the repressive state, and the culture of the society as a whole, in which failure or criticism were seen as \u201csabotage\u201d with serious punishment possible. This was combined, as we shall see below, with the conflicting interests of the different layers of Soviet society. Debates over inefficiencies and reforms such as those Chibber mentions took place within the central party bureaucracy aided by loyal academics and technocrats. The workers had no say in any of it.<\/p>\n<p>Trotsky <a href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/trotsky\/1932\/10\/sovecon.htm\">recognized this<\/a> in 1932, at the end of Stalin\u2019s first Five Year Plan:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The only prerogative which [the bureaucracy] ultimately left to the workers was the right to exceed production limits. Any attempt to influence economic management from below is immediately described as a right or a left deviation, that is, practically made a capital offence. The bureaucratic upper crust in the last analysis, has pronounced itself infallible in the sphere of socialist planning\u2026. Thus the basic mechanism of socialist construction\u2014the adaptable and elastic system of <em><strong>Soviet democracy<\/strong><\/em>\u2014was liquidated [Emphasis in original.]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Before going further into the implications of Stalinist society\u2019s class structure, it is necessary to look more closely at how the planning system worked.<\/p>\n<h4>Things, prices, money and conflicting class interests<\/h4>\n<p>The Five Year Plan began with a census of production and materials based on information from existing workplaces.<span title='This description of the planning system is taken mainly from George Gary, Money, Financial Flows, and Credit in the Soviet Union, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1977 and Ernest Mandel, The Soviet Economic Reforms and Yugoslav Experience, October 1968, Marxists.org, https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/mandel\/1968\/10\/ref-yugo.html ; Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, London: Merlin Press, 1971, pp. 248-604.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>1<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This description of the planning system is taken mainly from George Gary, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Money, Financial Flows, and Credit in the Soviet Union, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1977 and Ernest Mandel, The Soviet Economic Reforms and Yugoslav Experience, October 1968, Marxists.org, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/mandel\/1968\/10\/ref-yugo.html\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/mandel\/1968\/10\/ref-yugo.html<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> ; Ernest Mandel, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Marxist Economic Theory, London: Merlin Press, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">1971, pp. 248-604.<\/span><\/span> <\/span>Although it was based on actual material things, the planners did not attempt to allocate each and every item to a workplace or enterprise. Allocation was done with prices and money. Each item, whether raw materials, machinery, parts, energy, etc. was given a price based on cost plus an average profit. These were not market prices, however, since they were seldom adjusted for changes in demand or technology. Nevertheless, they served to aggregate and direct millions of items. Aggregates were adjusted at the regional and industry level. To meet the planned targets, enterprises purchased their inputs from one another up and down their supply chains at the assigned prices.<\/p>\n<p>While the state allocated resources for new investment, the national, regional, and industry planning centers did not distribute physical items themselves but tracked them in monetary terms. Targets (often missed) were adjusted annually. The principle of management bonuses tied to profitability of enterprises as an incentive to reduce costs was introduced as early as 1935, while the so-called Liberman reforms of the 1960s made enterprise profits the measure of performance. Each enterprise had a line of credit and could take loans from the State Bank in order to expand and\/or adjust for shortages or bottlenecks. Some enterprises were even shaped by U.S. industry. As Victor Reuther recounts from his time in Russia, Ford engineers helped shape the giant Gorky Car works along the lines of Ford\u2019s River Rouge complex, using the latest technology, while other U.S. giants such as General Electric, RCA, DuPont, and Westinghouse concluded technical and trade agreements with the Soviet government in the early 1930s.<span title='Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW\/ A Memoir, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, pp. 90-93.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>2<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Victor Reuther, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW\/ A Memoir, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, pp. 90-93.<\/span><\/span> <\/span>Stalin, apparently, was not averse to new capitalist technology. Western inputs, though marginal, continued during the war with the lend lease program and afterward under \u201cturnkey\u201d projects such as a Fiat built auto plant in the 1960s. In the early days of the Soviet Union, workers often pushed themselves to help make targets, but that did not last as living standards stagnated and party-led management did the pushing.<\/p>\n<p>There were various contradictions in this system. One lay in the conflicting interests between the enterprise managers and their workers, with managers receiving as much as four times the incomes of workers via bonuses. Another was that between the enterprises (and hence workers) and the bureaucratic state ruling class. According to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research, cited above, to sustain and expand the state, on which the power and higher standard of living of the ruling class rested, 90 percent of state budget receipts were obtained from these enterprises.<span title='Gary, p. 86.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>3<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Gary, p. 86.<\/span><\/span><\/span> There was also a sales tax on consumer goods and some capital items, known as a \u201cturnover\u201d tax which was a form of regressive taxation.<\/p>\n<p>But it was the expropriation of the profits from the enterprises -profits which came from the exploitation of the workers &#8211; that funded the state and its bureaucracy. The state budget grew by four times from 1950 to 1971, even as the economy slowed down. While Soviet enterprises could not go bankrupt, they were under pressure and incentivised via manager bonuses to produce increased surpluses to fund the state\u2019s growth. This meant that enterprise managers were encouraged both to push the workers to create more profit, leading to poor working conditions, and to hoard resources in order to meet performance and bonus targets. Hence there were incentives for managers to both lie about their enterprises and to misallocate resources.<\/p>\n<p>The contradictions in the Stalinist system of planning were most thoroughly analyzed in the mid-1960s by Polish Marxists Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski (henceforth K&amp;M), who spent a number of years in prison for their efforts.<span title='Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, (henceforth K&amp;M) \u201c An Open Letter to the Party\u201d, an International\u00a0 Socialism Publication, 1968; also in New Politics, vol. 5, nos. 2 &amp; 3, 1967. ' class='inline-footnote' style=''>4<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, (henceforth K&amp;M) \u201c An Open Letter to the Party\u201d, an International\u00a0 Socialism Publication, 1968; also in <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">New Politics, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">vol. 5, nos. 2 &amp; 3, 1967. <\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0 In their view \u201cthe central political bureaucracy is the ruling class\u201d by virtue of its \u201cexclusive command\u201d of the means of production and the fact that \u201cit buys the labor of the working class\u201d collectively appropriates the surplus produced by the workers\u00a0 \u201cin order to strengthen and expand its rule over production and society.\u201d As we saw above, the central political bureaucracy rules collectively on the basis of the surplus it extracts from the workers in the enterprises that fund the power of the state.\u00a0 In practice this meant the expansion of what K&amp;M call Department A, the production of the means of production at the expense of Department B, the production of consumer goods, a distinction similar to Marx\u2019s division between Department I and Department II developed in volume II of <em>Capital<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Evidence of this is that both Western and Soviet estimates for the relative growth of capital (K) and labor (L) inputs for the 1950s and 1960s show that capital inputs grew between seven\u00a0 and nine times more than that of labor inputs over that period.<span title='Martin L. Weitzman, Soviet Economic Growth and Capital-Labor Substitution,\u00a0 The American Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, September 1970, p. 677.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>5<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Martin L. Weitzman, Soviet Economic Growth and Capital-Labor Substitution,\u00a0 <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The American Economic Review, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Vol. 60, No. 4, September 1970, p. 677.<\/span><\/span> <\/span>Figures taken from Soviet sources also show that the growth rate of \u201cOutput of Production Means (Group A)\u201d increased faster than that for \u201cOutput of Consumer Goods (Group B)\u201d almost every year throughout the 1950s, 1960, and 1970s. Only as Soviet rulers desperately tried to curry favor with the workers, as the system\u2019s crisis increased in the late 1980s, did consumer goods output grow slightly faster as the regime approached collapse.<span title='Soviet History Archive (marxist.org), Annual Growth Rates in the Soviet Union, 1941-1989, https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/ussr\/government\/economics\/statistics\/growth-rates.htm#1950s ' class='inline-footnote' style=''>6<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Soviet History Archive (marxist.org), <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Annual Growth Rates in the Soviet Union, 1941-1989, <\/span><\/i><a href=\"https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/ussr\/government\/economics\/statistics\/growth-rates.htm#1950s\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/www.marxists.org\/history\/ussr\/government\/economics\/statistics\/growth-rates.htm#1950s<\/span><\/a> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>As Chibber pointed out, the state provided or subsidized some aspects of working-class subsistence\u2014healthcare, basic education, and to some extent childcare and housing. The overall living standards rose from the still largely peasant economy of the 1920s to an industrial economy of the post-war period. But for the working class living standards grew relatively slowly, well behind those in Western industrial countries <em>and<\/em> those of the bureaucracy and the new ruling class\u2014as Russian workers could plainly see. The provision of most consumer goods, and hence worker living standards, depended on their production in Department B and that was seen by the bureaucracy as a cost that undermined the production of the means of production that allowed for the growth of the economy, the state, and the international and domestic power of the central political bureaucracy. This included not only capital goods and raw materials, but the nation\u2019s massive military. It also underlies the bureaucracy\u2019s penchant for huge infrastructure projects, many of which were famously wasteful or never completed: highways that ended in the middle of nowhere, bridges that failed to cross the river, and so on. Despite the outcome, the larger the project, the more income and influence for the planners and managers. This meant a perpetual constraint on the growth of the living standards of the working-class majority. Increases in effort or nominal wages made no difference since consumer production in Department B remained relatively limited and store shelves empty.<\/p>\n<p>But it also meant an increasing disproportion, indeed a contradiction, between the growing means of production and relatively slower output for consumption, that led to overproduction and underutilization of the means of production and hence waste and the crisis of slower growth. As K&amp;M put it, \u201cThe common cause of the non-utilization of productive capacity and of accumulation of unneeded reserves is<em> the general inadaptation of production to needs<\/em> (emphasis in original).\u201d As they summarized it: \u201cit is a contradiction between class goals of production and consumption, and it results from existing conditions, not from mismanagement.\u201d On the basis of this contradiction, even in the mid-1960s over two decades before the collapse of the system, K&amp;M predicted the crisis. They wrote of this disproportion: \u201cWithout eliminating it, without changing the goal of production and the conditions of production as a whole, it will be impossible to overcome the ever growing crisis.\u201d<span title='K&amp;M, p. 34.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>7<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">K&amp;M, p. 34.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Banned from striking or organizing genuine unions, fighting politically, or in any way influencing the functioning of the enterprise, much less the direction of resources under Stalinist planning, the working classes of Russia and its associated Eastern European nations turned to their weapon of last resort\u2014the withdrawal of cooperation and efficiency. That is, the withholding of effort and the tacit skills and knowledge production workers everywhere possess. Those are the skills and knowhow that Frederick Taylor attempted to shift from the workers to management by breaking down tasks and offering incentives, that Elton Mayo and the human relations school sought to manipulate with changes in lighting and other conditions, and that lean production\u2019s \u201cconstant improvement\u201d (Kaizen) through teamwork tried to extract from the workers.<span title='For Taylor and Mayo see Gerard Hanlon, The Dark Side of Management: A Secret History of Management Theory, New York: Routledge, 2016; for lean production, Sungur Savran, Lean Production and Flexibility: The Highest Stage of Taylorism, in Sungar Savran and E. Ahmet Tonak (eds.), In the Tracks of Marx\u2019s Capital: Debates in Marxian Political Economy and Lessons for 21st Century Capitalism, Cham Switzerland: palgrave macmillan, pp. 265-316.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>8<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For Taylor and Mayo see Gerard Hanlon, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Dark Side of Management: A Secret History of Management Theory, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">New York: Routledge, 2016; for lean production, Sungur Savran, Lean Production and Flexibility: The Highest Stage of Taylorism, in Sungar Savran and E. Ahmet Tonak (eds.), <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the Tracks of Marx\u2019s Capital: Debates in Marxian Political Economy and Lessons for 21<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">st<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Century Capitalism, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Cham Switzerland: palgrave macmillan, pp. 265-316.<\/span><\/span> <\/span>Those skills and knowledge, along with extra effort,\u00a0 were withheld from the planners, bureaucrats, and managers of Stalinist central planning. As K&amp;M point out, \u201cThe worker tries to lower efficiency and hides the reserves in his sector to delay the changes in norms; he makes a product of inferior quality in order to meet the norms more easily.\u201d<span title='K&amp;M, p. 33.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>9<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">K&amp;M, p. 33.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Another form of worker dissatisfaction and\/or resistance in the Soviet Union was the relatively high rate of labor turnover. In theory, the Soviet Union maintained full employment at all times. In reality, there was significant labor turnover due largely to job dissatisfaction.\u00a0 Measured as only voluntary quits and firings in official figures (yes, workers could be fired) from 1950 to 1970, turnover in industry averaged 20 percent, while in construction it ran in the mid-30s. Workers left jobs due to poor working conditions or to seek higher wages elsewhere. This turnover was cited by Soviet sources as one of the causes of low productivity.\u00a0 This figure did not include workers assigned to other jobs or regions by the state, those who left to care for children, enrollment in studies, etc. Total \u201cseparations\u201d were much higher.<span title='David E. Powell, Labor Turnover in the Soviet Union, Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 1977, pp. 268-285.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>10<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">David E. Powell, Labor Turnover in the Soviet Union, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Slavic Review, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Vol. 36, No. 2, January 1977, pp. 268-285.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The consequence of these forms of resistance was an ever-decreasing rate of productivity, along with poor quality, and missed goals throughout the system that undermined planning targets, delivery of materials, the profits meant to measure performance, and innovation, further creating shortages and other problems. This most basic resistance was expressed in the well-known Russian workers\u2019 joke of the 1960s through the 1980s, that \u201cThey pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.\u201d In other words, it wasn\u2019t just (or even) the lack of market competition that led to inefficiency and crisis, but the suppression of democratic norms, on the one hand, and the stagnation of working-class living standards that resulted from the bureaucracy\u2019s production goals, on the other.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">It wasn\u2019t just (or even) the lack of market competition that led to inefficiency and crisis, but the suppression of democratic norms, on the one hand, and the stagnation of working-class living standards that resulted from the bureaucracy\u2019s production goals, on the other.<\/aside>\n<p>The irony here is that in the Stalinist system, the workers and public in general were paid in money and bought consumer goods with that money\u2014like a market\u2014but at the planners\u2019 prices and within the constraints of Department B production. This led K&amp;M to argue at one point that the market for needs should determine the output of consumer production. One might interpret this as advocating market socialism before the idea was common or simply that the goals of planning needed to begin with an assessment of production for needs as K&amp;M did. In no way did they reject central planning. In their view, a democratic workers\u2019 state \u201cwill set goals of social production, decide on the sharing and use of the national income, hence define the size and purpose of investments, the size and disbursement of expenditures for social benefits, health services, education, science and culture, the amount for the power apparatus and its current tasks.\u201d Since such decisions \u201ccan only be made centrally\u201d this requires a fully democratic multi-party system with workers councils and independent unions.<span title='K&amp;M, pp. 60-63.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>11<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">K&amp;M, pp. 60-63.<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0That is, central planning by the workers\u2019 democratic state.<\/p>\n<p>Certainly, in a workers\u2019 democracy that must support any version of socialism in which workers possess the freedom and rights to organize economically and politically, complain, suggest, and produce for need rather than the priorities of an exploiting upper class, they will be motivated to use their skills and knowledge in the cooperative and collective pursuit of raising the living standards of the masses with whom they live and work. Workers will have a direct interest in pointing out the inefficiencies, blockages, and problems that will arise with central planning and have the power to correct them over time. They will be able to innovate for their own advancement. Few of those socialists who give thought to these questions imagine that democratic planning will emerge overnight in one stroke or reject out of hand that elements of the market might play a role in the transition to socialist planning. But to rule out central (or decentralized) planning altogether is to throw out the socialist baby with the Stalinist bathwater.<\/p>\n<h4>Market Socialism: An Oxymoron?<\/h4>\n<p>In <a href=\"https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2026\/05\/market-socialism-capitalism-ownership-exploitation\">another interview<\/a> published in <em>Jacobin<\/em>, Chibber lays out his arguments for what he sees as the only viable alternative to a planned economy: market socialism. His vision of this, as yet untried, version of socialism is one in which enterprises are state- or worker-owned, hence no capitalists, the market distributes resources, and an elaborate welfare state provides a decent standard of living and safety net for all, including the inevitable losers in market competition. Rather than attempting to pick apart Chibber\u2019s description of and detailed arguments for market socialism, I want to put some admittedly rhetorical questions to Chibber or any defenders of this version of socialism.<\/p>\n<p>Chibber\u2019s basic argument for market socialism as opposed to a planned economy goes like this:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>This is the key thing, and the reason you want market socialism. The biggest failure of the planned economies was the inability to innovate, and the absence of innovation, efficiency, dynamism. The whole motivation to move toward a market socialist model is to give managers of firms, producers, an incentive to consistently innovate. And that incentive comes from competition.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>That is quite an assumption-loaded statement about the incentives for socialism, not to mention about human nature or desires. Is it really true that only competition can spur innovation? Isn\u2019t the whole economically competitive ethos of capitalism and, indeed, capitalism itself, an historically specific and limited development? In fact, isn\u2019t it mainly the capitalists and their hangers-on who are so economically competitive? On the other hand, isn\u2019t it the case that workers given the opportunity to form unions in their defense will struggle, as J.R. Commons put it, \u201cto take labor out of competition.\u201d Doesn\u2019t even our weak labor movement attempt to lessen competition through collective organization (i.e., cooperation), bargaining, and regulatory legislation to limit capital\u2019s competitive drive?<\/p>\n<p>Chibber\u2019s abstract version of competition with its price signals overlooks the fact that competition between firms is in reality a battle over market share in which innovation is a means to <em>that<\/em> end. If this is a real market and not just something like the Soviet \u201cmarket reforms\u201d there will be winners and losers with real consequences. As Braverman, Noble, and others have argued, technological innovation is never socially neutral.<span title='Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Peress, 1998; David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>12<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Harry Braverman, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, New York: Monthly Review Peress,<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">1998; David F. Noble, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.<\/span><\/span><\/span> Would technological innovation for production for need be the same as that for increased market share?\u00a0 Why would socialists want state or worker owned enterprises (and hence their workers) to fight one another over market share rather than working cooperatively through mutually agreed local and national plans to increase production for need? Capital pits workers in competition with one another\u2014individual v. individual, black v. white, men v. women, citizen v. immigrant, firm v. firm\u2014in order to keep wages down, effort up, the competition down, market share up, and capital accumulating. Why would worker-owned enterprises want to follow that pattern?\u00a0 After all, struggle and the process of fighting for change transforms people and their values.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">Why would socialists want state or worker owned enterprises (and hence their workers) to fight one another over market share rather than working cooperatively through mutually agreed local and national plans to increase production for need. Capital pits workers in competition with one another\u2026Why would worker-owned enterprises want to follow that pattern?<\/aside>\n<p>Why would workers in their millions organize, struggle, sacrifice, and endanger their lives and livelihoods to get rid of the capitalist bosses just to create state or cooperatively owned businesses that compete to survive, because\u2014advanced welfare state or not\u2014that\u2019s what economic competition is about as even Chibber admits at one point. Not to mention the periodic crises that competition generates. Around a million business establishments in the U.S. go under in normal years, more during recessions.<span title='BLS, Table 3, Number of private sector establishments by direction of employment, by establishment age, 5\/22\/26, www.bls.gov\/bdm\/us_age_naics_00_table3_txt ' class='inline-footnote' style=''>13<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">BLS, Table 3, Number of private sector establishments by direction of employment, by establishment age, 5\/22\/26, <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.bls.gov\/bdm\/us_age_naics_00_table3_txt\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">www.bls.gov\/bdm\/us_age_naics_00_table3_txt<\/span><\/a> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><\/span><\/span> <\/span>Why wouldn\u2019t they fail under market socialism? Why wouldn\u2019t competition under market socialism lead to pressures for work intensification in order to survive? Might workers not worry that competition would, once again, lead to pressure to contain consumption rather than increase it and increase effort rather than reducing it?<\/p>\n<p>Couldn\u2019t it be, instead, that workers, inventors, technicians, computer wizards, etc. would cooperatively innovate in production in order to <em>lighten<\/em> the workload, <em>shorten<\/em> work time, <em>raise<\/em> the standard of living and the culture of society as a whole domestically and internationally, and, indeed, to save the planet and future generations?\u00a0 That instead of hoarding innovations through \u201cproprietary\u201d knowledge and technology, to get the upper hand in competition as competing firms do, they would share it through planning? Couldn\u2019t it be that the incentive to collectively improve both work and life would prove as strong or stronger a motivation to innovate\u2014this time in their own interest\u2014than competition? Why assume that only competition and profits will motivate people to seek innovations in shifting to production for need?\u00a0 Couldn\u2019t it be that the solution to efficiency and innovation lies not in competition, but above all in worker initiative spurred by the goal of a better life and a safer world and the experience of beginning to actually achieve both? Would workers really organize collectively and fight against great odds only to compete? Isn\u2019t our goal the <em>cooperative<\/em> commonwealth?<\/p>\n<h4>No transition to socialism, no expropriation of the expropriators, without a rupture<\/h4>\n<p>Here I have to admit that my optimistic view of worker initiative stems in part from my years at <em>Labor Notes<\/em> seeing how workers we knew understood how production and competition actually worked and why <em>collective<\/em> action was their best defense. It also comes from my visit to Portugal in the mid-1970s during its revolution. There the young officer core of the military sided with, and indeed helped lead, the revolution that overthrew the fascist government so that capital was unable to mount a violent counter revolution. When the workers moved to seize the plants and other workplaces, most of the bosses and owners fled the country. The police and army stayed in their stations and barracks. The trams and trains ran for free, run and maintained by their workers. The lights stayed on. Our small group of ISers visited several worker-run facilities, but the most impressive was the giant shipyard at Lisbon.<\/p>\n<p>A shipyard is a complex of factories producing parts for the huge assembly facilities on the river. It involves almost every skill any manufacturing firm would need. We met with the elected workers\u2019 committee running the whole shipyard which was composed of workers from several political tendencies or parties,as well as non-affiliated workers. The old management personnel stayed meekly in their offices and played no role in production or discipline. The trade unions, some of whose leaders we also met with, functioned to defend workers when necessary and process grievances. Members of the elected managing committee abided by the \u201c<em>a partido<\/em>\u201d ethic whereby no one spoke for their tendency and all worked together cooperatively to manage the shipyard. Imagine that, socialists of different stripes working together! Of course, outside the workplace the parties competed for supporters as you would in a democracy. But, again, the struggle for a better life changes people.<\/p>\n<p>They explained the process of production and when asked how they could run such a complex operation, one replied something like\u2014we\u2019ve always run it. The cafeteria was flush with free food and wine. Well, it was Portugal. This was procured by barter from farmers for whom the yard\u2019s machinists made farm equipment parts and other tools in return for the food and wine. No market there. Needed inputs came from other worker-run factories and energy from worker-controlled utilities. Not sure how they were paid for.\u00a0 The biggest problem was that global capital was boycotting this and other worker-controlled firms and contracts were becoming scarce. International capital saw a precedent it didn\u2019t like and acted to stop it. Tragically, the counter revolution, although relatively bloodless, was not far off as the Socialist Party and Communist Party made their peace with capital and its acceptably non-fascist politicians. None of the so-called socialist countries offered aid or contracts to these enterprises either, no doubt as workers\u2019 control was as much anathema to them as to their capitalist rivals. The Portuguese workers didn\u2019t have the opportunity to initiate planning above the enterprise level or rudimentary barter, but they did show the instincts and ability to turn to collective and cooperative production.<\/p>\n<p>Remember, Chibber sees no capitalists in the market socialist economy. As he explains,<span title='Chibber, How Socialism.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>14<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Chibber, How Socialism.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>That means you\u2019re not going to have privately owned means of production. Either you\u2019re going to have the state owning the means of production at the national level; or you\u2019re going to have an economy of workers\u2019 cooperatives, in which there is no capitalist class that owns things but workers themselves have property rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\u201cNo capitalist class.\u201d The expropriators are expropriated. But where did the capitalists go? Why did they go? Unlike in Portugal in the mid-1970s it is unlikely that the superrich U.S. capitalists would just pack up and leave. I checked Chibber\u2019s manifesto, \u201cOur Road to Power\u201d written in 2017 to see what he said about transition. There was a lot in there about political and worker organization I agreed with (a mass cadre party with internal democracy, a certain level of discipline, rooted in the working class). But he also wrote, \u201cOur strategic perspective has to downplay the centrality of a revolutionary rupture and navigate a more gradualist approach.\u201d<span title='Vivek Chibber, \u201cOur Road to Power,\u201d Jacobin, December 5, 2017, https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2017\/12\/our-road-to-power' class='inline-footnote' style=''>15<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Vivek Chibber, \u201cOur Road to Power,\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Jacobin, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">December 5, 2017, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2017\/12\/our-road-to-power\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2017\/12\/our-road-to-power<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span> \u201c<em>Strategic<\/em> perspective\u201d?! No matter how much one might wish to downplay rupture or attempt to move gradually, given their numbers, incredible wealth, the owners of capital in the U.S. will certainly see their impending or unfolding expropriation as a rupture of historic proportions. As, indeed, it would be. Much greater in scale and impact than the Russian Revolution no matter how it was done. It is inconceivable, given their legions of paid dependents, friends in politics and the military, their wealth, etc. that U.S. capitalists would simply surrender all of that without a vicious fight of some sort\u2014even if, let\u2019s imagine, a DSA-backed majority in Congress passed a law (gradually?) nationalizing their property and President Ocasio-Cortez signed the bill. I looked at the highlighted reference to \u201ctransition\u201d in the text of the piece on market socialism, but it only led to an article about how social democracy had gone from a revolutionary movement to a reformist one as revolution ceased to be a foreseeable possibility. Hmm?<\/p>\n<p>Is that really something new? Eduard Bernstein, a leading theorist of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), laid the basis of modern social democratic reformism in 1899, a decade or so before one of the biggest revolutionary upsurges in European history. He argued capitalism had stabilized and revolution was off the agenda. Then came 1905, 1917, 1918, etc. Despite his famous statement that the final goal was \u201cnothing\u201d and the movement \u201ceverything\u201d, Bernstein denied abandoning socialism altogether but instead downplayed a \u201ccatastrophic\u201d revolutionary transition (rupture?) in favor of the gradual accumulation of reforms and the movement\u2019s strength, what was called at the time \u201crevisionism.\u201d In his 1909 preface to the famous <em>Evolutionary Socialism<\/em> (bad translation of his title), he insisted, \u201cthe book can, all in all, be regarded as an exposition of the theoretical and political tendencies of the German social democratic revisionists.\u201d<span title='Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, New York: Schocken Books, 1961, pp. viii' class='inline-footnote' style=''>16<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Eduard Bernstein, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Evolutionary Socialism, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">New York: Schocken Books, 1961, pp. viii<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0The revisionists would become the majority of the party\u2019s leadership and parliamentary delegations. The leadership of the SPD consciously derailed the 1918 German revolution in which the workers initially seized production and set up workers\u2019 councils.<span title='Pierre Brou\u00e9, The German Revolution, 1917-1923, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006, pp.129-283.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>17<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pierre Brou\u00e9, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The German Revolution, 1917-1923, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006, pp.129-283.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The problem is, as the history of German social democracy demonstrates, if you abandon the idea of a rupture, and simply embrace gradualism you necessarily give up the final goal: socialism of any kind in practice. As German (French, etc.) social democracy did well before the neoliberal era.<span title='See, for example, Hal Draper, The New Social Democratic Reformism, in Hal Draper, Socialism From Below, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019, pp. 97-114.See, for example, Hal Draper, The New Social Democratic Reformism, in Hal Draper, Socialism From Below, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019, pp. 97-114.' class='inline-footnote' style=''>18<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">See, for example, Hal Draper, The New Social Democratic Reformism, in Hal Draper, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Socialism From Below, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019, pp. 97-114.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">See, for example, Hal Draper, The New Social Democratic Reformism, in Hal Draper, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Socialism From Below, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019, pp. 97-114.<\/span><\/span><\/span> There is no way to eliminate the capitalist class as a class without an historic social\/political rupture. A world without capitalists is a qualitatively different one. You can, at least theoretically, do it by legislation rather than direct worker confiscation. You can go after the biggest ones first and work your way down the economic ladder, but it is still a rupture\u2014and that is not a matter of semantics but of social reality. So, if you \u201cdownplay rupture\u201d, what you are left with is a gradualism that has no way to achieve the expropriation of the expropriators. No doubt, Chibber would like to see the expropriators expropriated in order to achieve worker- or state-owned enterprises in market socialism. But he seems to have excluded any actual means of accomplishing that.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">The history of German social democracy demonstrates, if you abandon the idea of a rupture, and simply embrace gradualism you necessarily give up the final goal: socialism of any kind in practice\u2026There is no way to eliminate the capitalist class as a class without an historic social\/political rupture. A world without capitalists is a qualitatively different one. \u2026So, if you \u201cdownplay rupture\u201d, what you are left with is a gradualism that has no way to achieve the expropriation of the expropriators.<\/aside>\n<p>What about the Meidner Plan? The last refuge of gradualists, Sweden\u2019s Meidner Plan came as close as one could to a non-rupture model of the transition to a version of market socialism.<span title='I have mainly used this highly favorable account of the Meidner Plan: Joe Guinan, Socialising capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan, 2019, https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/37368092\/Socializing_capital_Looking_back_on_the_Meidner_Plan. ' class='inline-footnote' style=''>19<span class='footnoteContent' style='display:none;'><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">I have mainly used this highly favorable account of the Meidner Plan: Joe Guinan, Socialising capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan, 2019, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/37368092\/Socializing_capital_Looking_back_on_the_Meidner_Plan\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/37368092\/Socializing_capital_Looking_back_on_the_Meidner_Plan<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. <\/span><\/span> <\/span>Formulated fifty years ago, hence its current semi-centennial celebration as a panacea, by (German-born) Swedish trade union economist Rudolph Meidner, the plan proposed that each enterprise over a certain size annually issue new shares reflecting \u201cexcess profits\u201d that would go into \u201cwage-earner funds\u201d that were to be governed by union officials. Its dividends were mostly to go to social projects such as worker education. The idea was that as profits grew, the number and proportion of the fund-based shares would grow. Hence, in theory at least, eventual worker-ownership under union control would result. Investment decisions, however, were left to management, not the wage-earner fund. Meidner estimated that for a highly profitable company like Volvo it would take 20 years for the wage-earner-fund to own a majority of company shares (52%)\u2014longer for other companies. For the funds to control almost all shares (97%) it would take 100 years\u2014and that\u2019s for a highly profitable firm. The capitalists would be squeezed into a tiny minority of owners. Gradualism at its most glacial.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, since the shares were based on increased \u201cexcess\u201d profits it meant the workers would be encouraged to work harder and longer and\/or reduce the workforce via new technology to get to socialism. Class struggle to increase worker income or improve conditions would in practice reduce profits and hence the number of shares sent to the wage-earner fund, thus lengthening the road to ownership. The incentive was for unions to minimize conflict.\u00a0 Nevertheless, due to strong employer opposition and the retreat of the Social Democrats, the plan was drastically watered-down when implemented in 1984. Share ownership by the funds was controlled by government officials with some employee representatives. Wage-earner fund shares in any one company were limited to eight percent. After seven years the funds controlled only 3.5 percent of the total value of all Swedish company shares. It was a flop and further opposition from capital and its conservative government killed it in 1992.<\/p>\n<p>While in its original form it might appear to have passed the non-rupture test, its dilution and eventual death, in fact, underline the basic reason why there is no transition to socialism, no expropriation of the expropriators, without a rupture: the systemically-rooted dialectic of class conflict for survival. No matter how polite or gradualist the proposed transition, the capitalist class will recognize it as a threat and will not sit still for its own demise. In Sweden the threat was minimal and this was all quite peaceful. In Russia, Germany (ask Rosa), Chile, etc. not so peaceful. Any proposed \u201cRoad to Power\u201d that fails to take that into account is a path to defeat or worse. There is no socialism without a rupture.<\/p>\n<p>The major difference between revolutionary socialists and reformists or gradualists, of course, is not about whether you fight for reforms over time. Revolutionary socialists have always fought for reforms often alongside classic reformists and liberals. Nor is it a matter of revolutionary fantasies or impatience.\u00a0 It is about that big step, that rupture, the expropriation of the expropriators, no matter how it\u2019s accomplished, without which the final goal is inconceivable.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"half\" \/>\n<p><small><em>Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tempestmag.org\/about\/\">About Tempest Collective<\/a>.\u201d<\/em><\/small><br \/>\n<small>Featured Image credit: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/dullhunk\/51760206102\">Dunk<\/a>; modified by Tempest.<\/small><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Kim Moody<\/strong> assesses some recent writings and interview by <em>Catalyst editor<\/em> and podcaster Professor Vivek Chibber on state planning, market socialism and the transition to socialism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":100,"featured_media":15152,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[528,23],"class_list":["post-15150","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-marxist-theory","tag-theory"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/moody_response_chibber_feature_card.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15150","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/100"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15150"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15150\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15152"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15150"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15150"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15150"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}