{"id":14791,"date":"2026-04-29T15:31:49","date_gmt":"2026-04-29T19:31:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/?p=14791"},"modified":"2026-05-06T02:26:32","modified_gmt":"2026-05-06T06:26:32","slug":"irans-bleak-scenario","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2026\/04\/irans-bleak-scenario\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s \u201cbleak scenario\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span class=\"dropcap\">W<\/span>hen we speak of a revolution\u2019s failure, we usually mean that it did not fulfill its stated aims. In the case of Iran\u2019s 1979 revolution, however, the failure runs far deeper. That revolution not only failed to achieve its declared objectives; it failed in the most profound sense. It brought to power a force even more reactionary than the one it overthrew. What occurred was not simply a transfer of power but a historical regression whose consequences endure to this day. This regression extended beyond politics into the social and cultural fabric and even reshaped the intellectual horizons of society, setting the trajectory of development sharply backward.<\/p>\n<p>It is within this context that the discussion of the \u201cbleak scenario\u201d versus the \u201cbright scenario\u201d acquires meaning. This distinction does not stem from na\u00efve optimism about revolutionary processes, but from a concrete historical concern. In classical\u2014and, to some extent, ideological\u2014communist theory, political change is typically imagined as a revolutionary process in which the working class and organized popular forces seize power from the bourgeoisie to establish a new order. This vision presupposes a minimum level of social organization, continuity of production, and the capacity for political reconstruction. In other words, even amid revolution, it assumes that society does not disintegrate entirely and that the essential foundations for rebuilding remain intact.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">A coherent state in the conventional sense has never fully taken shape within the Islamic regime. What exists instead is a constellation of rival power factions.<\/aside>\n<p>The realities of Iranian society under the Islamic regime cast doubt on such assumptions. The systematic and often brutal destruction of every form of independent organization has rendered such social structuring practically impossible. For nearly five decades, the regime has crushed collective organization with extraordinary severity: dismantling political parties, dissolving councils, erasing labor unions, and imprisoning anyone who attempted to organize. Under such conditions, the idea of a coherent, conscious transfer of power to emancipatory forces seems less a political possibility than an expression of hope divorced from reality.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, Iranian society is caught in a structural deadlock. The Islamic Republic has reached a point where it can neither retreat nor advance. There is no clear horizon for resolving its intertwined economic, political, and social crises. Structural reform has become unfeasible, yet maintaining the status quo demands ever-deeper repression. This stalemate creates a situation where social explosions are always possible, but the organizational capacity to direct them is extremely weak\u2014if not entirely absent. This tension between an explosive potential and the absence of conscious direction forms the primary foundation of the \u201cbleak scenario.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, the very structure of the Islamic regime has evolved into a permanent source of instability. From its inception, the system has been anchored in an apocalyptic religious ideology that has shaped not only politics but also economic life, culture, and foreign policy. This ideology, animated by a self-ascribed historical mission, transcends the rational logic of a modern state. Decision-making, therefore, has been guided not by functional necessities but by ideological and security imperatives. (I have increasingly come to believe that the Islamic regime does not perceive itself as a conventional state. Instead, it acts as a marginal, semi-insurgent force with nothing to lose\u2014resembling groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, or Hashd al-Shaabi. Interestingly, Putin once referred to it in similar terms as a \u201crogue\u201d entity.)<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">Continuous repression has destroyed parties and civil institutions, creating an ever-wider gulf between society and the state.<\/aside>\n<p>Over the following decades, segments of the ruling establishment began to recognize this contradiction. They understood that governing a complex society in the 21st century through rigid, theological instruments was unsustainable. Attempts were made\u2014under banners such as \u201creconstruction\u201d and \u201creform\u201d\u2014to adjust the system, yet always within the same ideological limits. Each time demands for change surfaced, core power centers and autonomous hardline networks blocked them. Thus emerged a dual reality: the necessity of change, and the structural impossibility of realizing it from within. The result has been the cumulative deepening of crises and a progressive erosion of governing capacity.<\/p>\n<p>Consequently, a coherent state in the conventional sense has never fully taken shape within the Islamic regime. What exists instead is a constellation of rival power factions, shifting with each presidential administration, each seeking to consolidate its own position and privileges. These are not merely political rivals, but entrenched networks embedded across institutions. With each change at the top, these networks are reshuffled while the underlying logic persists. Each faction strives to expand its grip over resources\u2014from state contracts to financial assets. Over time, this dynamic has produced a rentier, predatory political economy. Economic decisions serve factional interests, not societal needs. Development projects function primarily as mechanisms for distributing rents. Public wealth is systematically siphoned into private networks\u2014oil rigs can vanish overnight. In such an environment, long-term planning becomes meaningless. Even at managerial levels, instability reigns: each political shift brings sweeping replacements, erasing institutional memory and undermining policy continuity.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">A transition beyond the Islamic Republic will not, by necessity, produce a more progressive or stable order\u2014though such a future remains possible and desirable.<\/aside>\n<p>The real danger becomes evident when this exhausted structure faces an acute crisis. The same factions now competing over resources may become the drivers of the \u201cbleak scenario\u201d during collapse. Importantly, this scenario is not chiefly produced by opposition groups. While external opposition may play a role, the core threat stems from forces currently inside the system. Each network, in its bid for survival, may resort to violence\u2014some through direct repression, others through paramilitary or localized armed groups. In such conditions, rivalry over resources may evolve into open conflict. Past experiences\u2014the brutal crackdowns of January 2018 and November 2019, and the regime\u2019s intervention in Syria\u2014show that the ruling establishment recognizes no limits when it comes to violence. This violence is not merely reactive but intrinsic to its mode of survival. When real solutions are unavailable, repression becomes the only remaining tool\u2014not to resolve crises, but to buy time. Yet this delay yields nothing: there is neither a strategy for exit nor the will for transformation. Each new wave of repression only deepens the crisis and moves society closer to explosion.<\/p>\n<p>For this reason, whether in the context of external war or mass protest, the risk of widespread violence is very real. The ruling factions see themselves as the rightful owners of the country\u2014and particularly its wealth\u2014and perceive no viable path toward relinquishing power or achieving peaceful transition. Meanwhile, a society deprived of organization and intermediary institutions lacks the means to manage a complex transition. Continuous repression has destroyed parties and civil institutions, creating an ever-wider gulf between society and the state. In such conditions, large-scale protests risk encountering both extreme violence and the absence of structures capable of guiding them. This volatile mix is what makes the \u201cbleak scenario\u201d genuinely possible. At the regional level, the Islamic Republic\u2019s close ties to aligned militant groups only heighten this risk, allowing domestic crises to escalate and spill beyond borders.<\/p>\n<aside class=\"pullquote\">The central question \u2026 is how to carve out a \u2026 path amid this dark horizon \u2026 that neither rests on revolutionary illusions nor surrenders to the existing order.<\/aside>\n<p>Thus, discussing the \u201cbleak scenario\u201d is not an abstract exercise but a sober warning. It underscores that a transition beyond the Islamic Republic will not, by necessity, produce a more progressive or stable order\u2014though such a future remains possible and desirable. The immediate aftermath may involve instability, violence, or even social fragmentation. Yet this is not a historical dead end. Eventually, society will be compelled to move beyond it. The crucial point is that this transition\u2014whether imminent or delayed\u2014will inevitably carry immense tension and cost. The current structure is incapable of stepping aside or yielding peacefully. The longer the transition is postponed, the deeper and more destructive the coming crisis is likely to be. Hence, the issue is not one of when, but of how\u2014of the quality and character of that transition.<\/p>\n<p>The central question now is how to carve out a genuine path amid this dark horizon\u2014a path that neither rests on revolutionary illusions nor surrenders to the existing order. A path that, even under these harsh conditions, can nurture organization, solidarity, and conscious agency. Addressing this question demands further analysis, which I hope to undertake in a future piece.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"half\">\n<small><em>Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Tempest Collective. For more information, see \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tempestmag.org\/about\/\">About Tempest Collective<\/a>.\u201d<\/em><\/small><br \/>\n<small>Featured Image credit: <a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Government_officials_meet_with_the_Supreme_Leader_of_Iran-September_9,_2008.jpg\">Khamenei.ir<\/a>; modified by Tempest.<\/small><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The brutal Islamic Republic has been prone to recurring\u2014and growing\u2014crisis, even before the current U.S.\/Israeli assault, writes <strong>Nasser Asgary<\/strong>. The regime\u2019s fall could give rise, at least for some time, to something worse.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":453,"featured_media":14794,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[121],"class_list":["post-14791","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-iran"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Copy-of-tempest_feature_card-55.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14791","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/453"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14791"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14791\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14794"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14791"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14791"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14791"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}