{"id":12940,"date":"2024-05-09T23:58:38","date_gmt":"2024-05-10T03:58:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.tempestmag.org\/?p=12940"},"modified":"2024-05-15T13:22:05","modified_gmt":"2024-05-15T17:22:05","slug":"trumps-danger-isnt-that-hes-a-fascist","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tempestmag.org\/test02\/2024\/05\/trumps-danger-isnt-that-hes-a-fascist\/","title":{"rendered":"Trump\u2019s danger isn\u2019t that he\u2019s a fascist"},"content":{"rendered":"

T<\/span>he imminent rematch between Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has reignited the \u201cfascism debate<\/a>.\u201d Lengthy arguments over whether Trump is a fascist have been a regular feature of political commentary and analysis since the emergence of Trumpism as a reactionary, authoritarian, populist movement.<\/p>\n

These debates have only proliferated since Trumpist rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021 to prevent Congress from formalizing Biden\u2019s victory in the 2020 presidential election, fuelled by the conspiracist belief that Biden had \u201cstolen\u201d the election through voter fraud. Our contention is that, while Trump is dangerous, he\u2019s not a fascist, \u201ccreeping<\/a>\u201d or otherwise. Rather, Trump is dangerous because he\u2019s a centrist.<\/p>\n

As most readers have probably gathered, we\u2019re using \u201ccentrist\u201d very differently from its normal, contemporary meaning of someone with \u201cmoderate\u201d political views positioned somewhere between left and right. Instead, we\u2019re using \u201ccentrist\u201d in a sense inspired by its older Marxist meaning<\/a> of someone whose political positions stand or oscillate between being reformist and being revolutionary. In the early interwar period, centrism in this sense was perhaps most closely associated with the short-lived International Working Union of Socialist Parties<\/a> (IWUSP), often called the \u201cTwo-and-a-Half International<\/a>\u201d to denote its position midway between the reformist Second International and the revolutionary Third International.1

The contemporary far right: reformists and revolutionaries<\/h4>\n

In brief, both Marxist and non-Marxist writers highlight that the contemporary far right has both a \u201creformist\u201d and a \u201crevolutionary\u201d wing. On the non-Marxist side, Cas Mudde describes the \u201cfar right\u201d as \u201cthose on the right who are \u2018anti-system\u2019, defined here as hostile to liberal<\/em> democracy.\u201d 2

On the Marxist side, Neil Davidson and David Renton draw similar distinctions. In Davidson<\/a>\u2019s view, the fascist and non-fascist hard right share \u201ca primary social base of membership of support in one or more fractions of the middle class\u201d and \u201can ideology of extreme nationalism, in which the nation is usually under double threat from above and inside by treacherous elites and from below and outside by disruptive external intruders.\u201d In addition to these commonalities, Davidson identifies three main differences. First, unlike other sections of the hard right, fascist movements seek to destroy working class organizations. Second, while fascists may make use of elections to gain power, they mainly rely on paramilitary organization and violence, whereas the non-fascist hard right is primarily electoral, seeking to attain office through the normal operation of bourgeois democracy. Third, while the non-fascist hard right\u2019s objective is restorationist, aiming \u201cto push popular attitudes and legal rights back to some lost Golden Age, a time before the homogeneity of the people was polluted by immigration and its virtues compromised by decadent elites,\u201d fascism is characterized by<\/p>\n

a project of transformation which seeks the creation of a \u201cnew\u201d society, the final realisation of a national destiny which had hitherto been denied. But to achieve this the people\u2014inevitably conceived in racial terms\u2014themselves must be purified, must prove themselves worthy of the world which the fascists hope to bring into being.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In other words, the differences between the fascist and non-fascist wings of the hard right aren\u2019t simply differences of method; that is, it\u2019s not just that fascists make recourse to extra-parliamentary activity. There\u2019s also a difference in purpose. This is what makes fascism \u201crevolutionary\u201d and the non-fascist hard right \u201creformist.\u201d In Davidson\u2019s view, fascist seizures of power are \u201cpolitical revolutions\u201d; that is, they are \u201cactions which change the nature and personnel of the political regime without changing the mode of production.\u201d Largely agreeing with Davidson\u2019s analysis, Renton remarks that one can think of these contrasts between different traditions of the right in terms of \u201chow far they are willing to go in the defence of capitalism.\u201d 5

For conservatives, the best means are to maintain social relationships which already exist; for the far right the task is to restore relationships which are perceived to have been lost; for fascists the task is counter-revolution, the nation must be purged of its enemies.6

None of this is to say that there\u2019s an unbridgeable chasm between the \u201creformist\u201d and \u201crevolutionary\u201d wings of the hard right. Ultimately, both sprout from the same ideological seedbed and, as we\u2019ll see in detail below in the U.S. context, the \u201cpull\u201d that different sections of the right exert on each other often generates a dynamic, even mercurial, interrelationship, with individual political parties shifting from more \u201creformist\u201d to more \u201crevolutionary\u201d modes and vice versa.7

Why Trump is a centrist<\/h4>\n

As many readers would presumably have surmised by this point, this is what we mean when we figuratively call Trump a \u201ccentrist.\u201d As historical \u201ccentrists\u201d stood or oscillated between the reformist and revolutionary Left, Trump stands or oscillates between the \u201creformist\u201d and \u201crevolutionary\u201d far right. This analysis contrasts with a substantial proportion of writing on whether Trump is a fascist, much of which tends to conclude that he is, with little contestation. We believe this is partially due to a tendency to view all far-right movements through the lens of fascism, rather than situating fascism as one form of far-right politics among many.<\/p>\n

\"President
President Donald J. Trump delivers remarks at the Presidential Medal of Freedom ceremony for economist Arthur B. Laffer, the \u201cFather of Supply-Side Economics\u201c Wednesday, June 19, 2019, in the Oval Office of the White House. (Official White House Photo<\/a> by Shealah Craighead)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the wake of January 6, Robert O. Paxton, author of an influential book<\/a> that sought to establish a more concise definition of fascism, wrote a piece<\/a> providing a fairly detailed outline of concerning things about Trump that lead people to see the threat of fascism in his political successes. One similarity Paxton notes between Trump and historical fascist leaders is Trump’s use of modern communication to talk about national decline, echoing Trotsky<\/a>‘s writings on how fascism is modernity and reaction combined, a \u201ccultural\u00a0 excrement.\u201d<\/p>\n

For Paxton, like many, January 6, with the terrifying image of Trumpists storming the Capitol to try to keep Trump in power, represented a turning point in Trumpism. This event caused Paxton to view Trump as a fascist after initially not doing so. Indeed, Davidson, whose distinctions between the fascist and non-fascist hard right have been significant for our own analysis, remarked that \u201c[i]f defeated in 2020, Trump almost certainly will claim electoral fraud, but will not attempt to cling to power through a coup.\u201d On that point, history has clearly proved him wrong.<\/p>\n

Paxton compares Trump\u2019s unsuccessful coup with the Veterans\u2019 Riots of February 6, 1934 in France. These riots took place on the Place de la Concorde in Paris, near the National Assembly building. They were the culmination of a long, demagogic campaign by the fascists and their supporters against parliamentary corruption and provoked a major political crisis, causing Prime Minister \u00c9douard Daladier to resign. Despite the parallels, Paxton concludes that January 6 ironically left Trumpism with less support in American society than the Veterans\u2019 Riots did for the far right in France. In Paxton\u2019s view, the latter riots deepened divisions in French society and paved the way for the Nazi-collaborationist Vichy regime.<\/p>\n

\"Black
October 24, 1940: Handshake between Hitler and Philippe P\u00e9tain, the French general who commanded the French Army in World War I and became the head of the collaborationist regime of Vichy France from 1940-1944 during World War II Photo<\/a>: Wikimedia Commons.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Paxton\u2019s analysis raises a serious point. Trumpism includes far-right elements who engage in street-level violence with sometimes lethal results, perhaps seen most vividly in Charlottesville in 2017. QAnon as a conspiracy theory and movement has created a messianic mythos around Trump. January 6 undoubtedly saw a mob attempt to block a formal, bourgeois-democratic handover of power, with Trump encouraging them to do so.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, serious complications arise. To begin with, the individual motivations of January 6 protesters were disparate. Some might have known that it was a coup and wanted to overthrow democracy to make Trump their F\u00fchrer. However, many bought into conspiracies that a shadowy cabal of Democrats had perverted the electoral process and therefore saw themselves as defending<\/em> American democracy.<\/p>\n

Two things spring to mind here. First, as Davidson notes, in contrast to historical fascism\u2019s explicit hostility to democracy as \u201can impediment to the pure expression of the people\u2019s will to which their party or leader has direct access,\u201d contemporary fascism can face both ways regarding democracy, even if they\u2019d still attempt to suppress democracy once in power. Thus, Trump positioning himself as upholding a democratic outcome against the machinations of a corrupt establishment, and many of his supporters buying into this, doesn\u2019t automatically discount Trump from being a fascist. All the same, the point made earlier about how fascism is distinguished not only by its recourse to extra-parliamentary methods, but also by its purpose<\/em>, still stands.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s infamous slogan to \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d is fundamentally restorationist. While fascist movements often invoke a mythologized national past, as previously stated, this is coupled with a much more conscious and thoroughgoing project of creating a new society that actualizes the nation\u2019s denied destiny. Although Trump is promising more extensive replacements of personnel in the U.S. federal civil service and other state machinery, this is a long way off from a political revolution, especially when one bears in mind that, compared to countries like the U.K., the employment and dismissal of civil servants in the U.S. is already very politically partisan.<\/p>\n

\"About
Alt-right members preparing to enter Emancipation Park holding Nazi, Confederate Battle, Gadsden “Don’t Tread on Me,” League of the South, and Thor’s Hammer flags, at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, August 12, 2017. Photo<\/a>: Anthony Crider.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Second, while Trumpism may have its thugs, including far-right militias, and Trump has encouraged violence against political opponents at home, compared to historical fascism, Trump\u2019s organization and deployment of extralegal violence has been very unsystematic. As the celebrated historian of the Third Reich Richard J. Evans<\/a> puts it, what we\u2019ve seen from Trump and his supporters even after January 6 \u201cbears no comparison to the hundreds of thousands of armed and uniformed stormtroopers and Squadristi<\/em> that the Nazi and fascist leaders deployed on to the streets daily in the 1920s and early 1930s to intimidate, beat up, arrest, imprison and often kill political opponents.\u201d<\/p>\n

One sees this contrast from January 6 itself. The rioters\u2019 storming of the Capitol wasn\u2019t an organized, pre-planned attempt by Trump to seize power and, by the time Trump called on the extra-parliamentary forces around Trumpism, it was too little, too late. He lost the initiative to rally these forces and take command, and they ultimately proved too disunited and undisciplined for a successful assault on the institutions of bourgeois democracy.<\/p>\n

To be clear, we\u2019re not claiming that Trump\u2019s words and actions prior to the riot provided no encouragement for it: clearly, the rioters saw Trump as their leader and felt emboldened by his continued \u201cstolen election\u201d claims. Rather, we\u2019re making the point that Trump\u2019s relationship to those supporters of his who are willing to use extralegal violence is evidently not the very direct commander-footsoldier relationship that characterized historical fascist paramilitaries.<\/p>\n

This is not to say that the movement can never become more organized and effective. As well as the Veterans\u2019 Riots of 1934, January 6 has some echoes of the Nazis\u2019 failed Beer Hall Putsch in Munich on November 8-9, 1923. As Evans observes, from that experience, Hitler learned that he couldn\u2019t seize power through an open, armed confrontation with the government and that he needed to use the ballot box and win \u201cthe support of the political elite, the army, business, the civil service and the police.\u201d The Nazis\u2019 electoral successes in 1932 and 1933 enabled Hitler\u2019s appointment as Chancellor and his consolidation of power once in office. Looking at Trump\u2019s new campaign for the presidency, one can justifiably wonder if he could achieve something similar.<\/p>\n

We have reasons to be doubtful. While the Nazis made use of elections to come to power, this electoral strategy was deployed alongside<\/em> a growing, coordinated street movement and regimented paramilitary, with the SA reaching approximately 400,000 members by January 1932.8

\"Black
Nazis at the Marienplatz in Munich during the Beer Hall Putsch, Where Hitler and the Nazi Party planned to seize Munich and use the city as a base for a march against Germany\u2019s national government. November 9, 1923. Photo<\/a>: Wikimedia Commons.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Trump has continued with his claims of conspiracy, but has fallen back on the electoral path to the White House rather than violence precisely because he can\u2019t do anything else. No organized street movement or paramilitary has been forthcoming, and many of the True Believers who may have participated in January 6 are now prosecuted, demoralized, or so off the deep end as to make very unreliable Brownshirts.<\/p>\n

Then there\u2019s the important matter of ruling-class support. As Kit Wainer and Charles Post<\/a> observe,<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s attempts to retain office despite losing the election failed for a simple reason: the complete absence of any interest among leading capitalists or state bureaucrats to eradicate or even weaken the Constitutional order in order to extend Trump\u2019s presidency…. None of the players Trump needed to play central roles in his efforts to hold on to power had any incentive to cooperate. Quite the contrary, their futures were bound up with the stability of the capitalist state, a state whose limits can not easily be stretched by a single politician.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This contrasts starkly with the substantial support from leading capitalists and political elites gained by the Nazis between the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 and Hitler\u2019s declaration of himself as F\u00fchrer in 1934, as well as that gained by the new right in France between the Veterans\u2019 Riots of 1934 and the founding of the Vichy regime in 1940. While Trump\u2019s road to the Republican presidential candidacy shows the extent to which he enjoys political hegemony over the Republican Party and support from right-wing think tanks, this by itself doesn\u2019t mean that he has or is likely to win even the reluctant backing of the ruling classes.<\/p>\n

This is not to say that Trump is entirely lacking in ruling-class confidence, and he gets some leeway in his radicalism due to the currently rigid two-party system of the U.S. Still, it is notable that the legal cases for fraud and sexual assault that have dogged him since 2021 have been quite ruinous for his personal and business finances. It seems no rich benefactors have helped pay his fines or bonds, necessitating at some point a fire sale of property or declaration of bankruptcy. So, to prevent this, he resorts to peddling cheap junk to his True Believers to raise funds and delay the inevitable until he gets back into the White House.<\/p>\n

While it\u2019s far from impossible, it would certainly be odd for the bourgeoisie to see fit to make a dictator out of the man they don\u2019t trust enough to lend money to. And while we certainly live in an era characterized by overlapping crises (e.g., climate change, mass involuntary migration), as well as large protest waves (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Palestine solidarity) that have elicited repressive law-and-order measures, these don\u2019t threaten the overall stability of bourgeois rule or the capitalist system in anything like the way the conditions of extensive militarization and demobilization, widespread unemployment, high inflation, and the Russian Revolution and subsequent mass workers\u2019 movements did in Europe shortly after the First World War.<\/p>\n

In other words, there\u2019s currently no crisis of the sort that could plausibly be used to turn the U.S. into a fully-fledged dictatorship, let alone to attempt to reshape society to the revolutionary extent of a fascist. Therefore, any attempt by Trump to do this would almost certainly lack any major ruling-class support and erode whatever ruling-class or more moderate support he currently enjoys.<\/p>\n

Why Trump\u2019s \u201ccentrism\u201d makes him dangerous<\/h4>\n

As already suggested in our discussion of the historical \u201cTwo-and-a-Half International,\u201d the position of left-wing centrists in the older Marxist sense was often seen as weak: too radical for the respectability of the electoralist, reformist Left, but too timid to be comfortable around the revolutionaries, leaving the centrists hopelessly vacillating between the two. So, if Trump and those similar to him are in an analogous position on the right, why is this a cause for concern? Surely he\u2019d succumb to the same weakness?<\/p>\n

The issue here comes in the relationship between these ideologies on the one hand and capital on the other. When the centrists of the Left face pressure from capital, they have to choose whether to throw their lot in with the revolutionaries or the electoralists\u2014but capitalists are much less threatened by the Right than by the Left, even when that Right is \u201crevolutionary.\u201d For the most part, fascists and other far-right movements have left capitalism intact after taking power, even when such movements have heavily relied on anti-establishment or pro-worker rhetoric. In a crisis so serious that the usual means of maintaining rule prove inadequate, capitalists see fascism as a safer bet than the failed mainstream politics, or the threat of a workers\u2019 revolution, and this benefit is afforded even more so to less \u201crevolutionary\u201d\u2014but still unorthodox\u2014politicians on the far right.<\/p>\n